

# **JORDANIAN NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE FUTURE OF MIDDLE EAST STABILITY**

**W. Andrew Terrill**

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
## **FOREWORD**

The United States and Jordan have maintained a valuable mutually-supportive relationship for decades as a result of shared interests in a moderate, prosperous, and stable Middle East. In this monograph, Dr. W. Andrew Terrill highlights Jordan's ongoing value as a U.S. ally and considers ways the U.S.-Jordanian alliance might be used to contain and minimize problems of concern to both countries. Although Jordan is not a large country, it is an important geographical crossroads within the Middle East and has been deeply involved in many of the most important events in the region's recent history. Now, the importance of this relationship has increased, and Jordan has emerged as a vital U.S. ally in the efforts to stabilize Iraq and also resist violent extremism and terrorism throughout the region.

Dr. Terrill notes the importance of Jordanian political reform, but also recommends patience, opposing the idea of coercing Jordan on democratization issues while Amman is currently struggling to cope with severe refugee and terrorism problems resulting from the war in Iraq. He devotes considerable attention to threats against Jordan emanating from the ongoing terrorist activity and sectarian warfare in Iraq. Dr. Terrill takes an especially close look at the Jordanian program to train 50,000 Iraqi police officers and also considers the ongoing role of Jordan in training Special Operations forces of a variety of friendly Arab countries. This monograph also considers the broader implications for the United States and the region if the Jordan government is crippled in its ability to function by spillover problems from Iraq.

Jordanian differences with Iran, which go back to the 1979 Islamic Revolution, are also considered. While such differences are serious and have worsened since 2003, Jordan remains interested in improving its relations with Tehran and has sought out areas of agreement with the Iranian regime. On the Israeli-Palestinian front, Amman is seeking ways to calm the West Bank and Gaza Strip and serve as advocate of Palestinian rights while maintaining normal relations with Israel. A special Jordanian fear is that a possible Palestinian civil war between the Hamas and Fatah organizations will create a wave of refugees from the west just as the crisis in Iraq has led to at least 750,000 Iraqi refugees fleeing from problems in their country.

The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer this monograph as a contribution to the national security debate on this important subject as our nation continues to grapple with a variety of challenges associated with the U.S. presence in the Iraq and the larger Middle East. This analysis should be especially useful to U.S. strategic leaders as they seek to address the complicated interplay of factors related to Middle Eastern security issues and the support of local allies. This work may also benefit those seeking a greater understanding of the strategic importance of Jordan. We hope this monograph will benefit officers of all services, as well as other U.S. government officials visiting Jordan or the larger Middle East region, and that it will contribute to strengthening the U.S.-Jordanian strategic relationship.



DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.  
Director  
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## BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

W. ANDREW TERRILL joined the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) in October 2001, and is the General Douglas MacArthur Professor of National Security Affairs. Prior to his appointment, he served as a Middle East nonproliferation analyst for the International Assessments Division of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). In 1998-99, Dr. Terrill also served as a Visiting Professor at the U.S. Air War College on assignment from LLNL. He is a former faculty member at Old Dominion University in Norfolk, Virginia, and has taught adjunct at a variety of other colleges and universities. He is a retired U.S. Army Reserve lieutenant colonel and Foreign Area Officer (Middle East). Dr. Terrill has published in numerous academic journals on topics including nuclear proliferation, the Iran-Iraq War, Operation DESERT STORM, Middle Eastern chemical weapons, ballistic missile proliferation, terrorism, and commando operations. Since 1994, at U.S. State Department invitation, Dr. Terrill has participated in the Middle Eastern Arms Control and Regional Security (ACRS) Track 2 talks, which are part of the Middle East Peace Process. He has also served as a member of the military and security working group of the Baker/Hamilton Iraq Study Group throughout its existence in 2006. Dr. Terrill holds a B.A. from California State Polytechnic University and an M.A. from the University of California, Riverside, both in Political Science. He also holds a Ph.D. in International Relations from Claremont Graduate University, Claremont, California.



## SUMMARY

One of the most important and longstanding strategic relationships for the United States within the Arab World has been with Jordan. The value of this relationship has increased significantly since 2003 as the result of ongoing U.S. difficulties in Iraq and the wider Middle East. Jordan's longstanding ties with the West, ongoing counterterrorism efforts, and moderate policies toward Iraq and Israel suggest that it may become a central target of violent extremism in coming years. Moreover, Jordan's strategic location within the Middle East (bordering Israel, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and the Palestinian West Bank territory) make it an especially attractive target for any revolutionary group with region-wide aspirations.

Jordan strongly advised the United States against its 2003 invasion of Iraq but has, nevertheless, sought to find ways to help stabilize Iraqi society after Saddam Hussein's ouster from power. Amman has made these efforts (including a program to train Iraqi police) in partnership with the United States. Jordan's fortunes have often been linked to events in Iraq, its larger and more populous neighbor, and the current instability in that country is of special concern to Amman. The best possible Iraqi outcome for Jordan would be the eventual emergence of a stable, pro-Western, pro-Jordanian state, which effectively integrates Iraq's Sunni Arabs into the emerging political system. The realization of this goal does not appear likely for the foreseeable future, but the Jordanians can be expected to support any reasonable efforts to contain and minimize Iraqi internal warfare which impacts on them through such issues as refugee flow from Iraq and increases in cross

border terrorism and crime. Currently, there are at least 750,000 Iraqi refugees in Jordan.

Ongoing setbacks in Iraq's political reconciliation process suggest that stability there may remain problematic for some time, and that professional terrorists tempered in the crucible of Iraqi fighting may prove a region-wide menace. The Jordanians are concerned about this process and have defined terrorism as the greatest threat that their country is facing. They have also intensified efforts at fighting terrorists including Iraq-based radicals such as the now deceased Jordanian criminal turned al Qaeda leader, Abu Musab al Zarqawi, who was hunted down and killed by U.S. military forces with the aid of Jordanian intelligence. Jordan is also seeking to battle terrorism outside of its own borders and can be an important U.S. ally in containing and resisting radicalism throughout large parts of the region. In this regard, the Jordanian monarchy has often depended upon its highly professional military and intelligence services to help protect the government from both internal and external adversaries. The Jordanian government has for decades encouraged friendly Arab countries to send officers and soldiers to take advantage of training opportunities in Jordan. The new U.S.-funded King Abdullah II Special Operations Training Center builds on this tradition, and is an important tool in the struggle against terrorist extremism.

The Jordanians remain deeply suspicious of Iran and view the post-2003 expansion of Iranian political influence with great concern. Iranian influence in Iraq is a particularly troublesome concern. The Jordanians are also opposed to the development of an Iranian nuclear weapons option, but publicly oppose an Israeli or U.S. military strike against Iranian nuclear facilities.

Amman assumes that the Tehran leadership is rational and deterrable, and the Jordanians are willing to make that judgment despite the fact that an Israeli-Iranian nuclear exchange could have catastrophic consequences for Jordan. The Jordanian leadership also continues to stress that its primary regional concern is finding a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian confrontation through ongoing interaction with both parties. Jordan has worked closely with Palestinian Authority President Mohammad Abbas, but remains deeply suspicious and watchful regarding the activities of the Hamas organization which it views as inclined to unproductive meddling in Jordanian politics.

The value of the U.S.-Jordanian relationship can also be expected to grow in importance as the United States moves to withdraw eventually from Iraq. Under these circumstances, Jordan will continue to seek ways to address any cross border problems resulting from the ongoing conflict in Iraq. Likewise, Jordan will continue to use its excellent intelligence and military services to wage an unrelenting war on al Qaeda and help train friendly Arab forces to do the same. The United States must, therefore, continuously seek to aid Jordan in coping with terrorism and other dangers as part of a Middle East policy that aids moderation and hopes to provide the region with a viable future.



## **JORDANIAN NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE FUTURE OF MIDDLE EAST STABILITY**

Many obituaries of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan have been prepared for instant use. . . . But it still lives and the obituaries gather dust on the files.

Peter Mansfield<sup>1</sup>

I'll be quite honest with you. We're in a state of war. . . . I hate to say it, but we're picking up terrorist groups [at a rate of] one every two weeks.

King Abdullah II  
December 2004<sup>2</sup>

We see there is great benefit of having the King Abdullah II Special Operations Training Center in Jordan and all friendly counter-terrorism forces from all over the world coming to train.

Colonel Maher Halaseh  
Project Director for the development  
of a now-operational, state of the art  
special operations and counterterrorism  
center in Jordan<sup>3</sup>

### **Introduction.**

The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan is central to the geopolitics of the Middle East region and borders on Syria, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Israel, and the Palestinian West Bank. This geography also places the Jordanians adjacent to two major centers of actual and potential conflict: (1) the Israel-Palestine theater and (2) the Iraq/Gulf theater. Although it has an important geographical position, Jordan is also a relatively small

country (about the size of Indiana) with only around 6 million citizens. It has limited natural resources and no oil, leaving the Jordanians with uncertain leverage to influence regional events. To the extent possible, Amman has sought to remain engaged with all of its neighbors and head off any potential problems before they can develop into a crisis. Hostile neighbors can be particularly problematic for a small country like Jordan, and when considering policy options, the Jordanians often draw from their unpleasant experience of severe regional isolation at some key times in the region's history. Additionally, throughout its existence, Jordan has depended heavily on foreign aid to support its often fragile economy. In recent years, such aid has been provided by a diversity of donors including Arab states, the European Union, and especially the United States.<sup>4</sup>

The United States and Jordan have maintained a mutually-supportive and positive relationship for decades as a result of shared interests in a moderate, prosperous, and stable Middle East. This bilateral relationship has often been of considerable value to both nations despite obvious disparities between the two in size and power. The relationship has also been able to survive and overcome various periods of disagreement and division such as occurred in 1990-91 when Amman was unwilling to join the U.S.-sponsored United Nation's coalition to eject Saddam Hussein from Kuwait. In the turbulent post-Saddam era, the future of Jordan can be expected to relate directly to the future stability of that region, as well as to the possibilities for meaningful U.S.-Arab collaboration. A prosperous and stable Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan clearly remains strongly in U.S. national interests.

Jordan's fortunes have often been linked to events in its larger and more populous neighbor, Iraq, and the

current instability in that country is correspondingly of special concern to Amman. The best possible Iraqi outcome for Jordan would be the eventual emergence of a stable, pro-Western, pro-Jordanian state, which effectively integrates Iraq's Sunni Arabs into the emerging political system. Reaching such a goal does not appear likely for the foreseeable future, but the Jordanians can be expected to support any reasonable efforts to contain and minimize Iraqi internal warfare which affects them through such issues as refugee flow out of Iraq and increases in cross border terrorism and crime. Conversely, a full-scale Lebanese-style civil war in Iraq would be a nightmare for Jordan, and the Jordanians will need tremendous help in coping with the consequences should such a catastrophe occur. Under these circumstances, Jordan can either be a helpless conduit for radical influence coming out of Iraq or it can be a wall of resistance halting and perhaps helping to roll back radical advances depending, at least to some extent, on the support it receives from the United States and other allies.

Other challenges that Amman must address include problems with terrorism, the dangers posed by an empowered Iran, and ongoing Israeli-Palestinian and intra-Palestinian difficulties. Terrorism is not a new concern for the Jordanians, but new and more virulent strains will provide a different kind of threat. Additionally, relations between Jordan and Iran have been marked by suspicion since the 1979 revolution and may become even more problematic as the Iranians extend their influence into Iraq. Moreover, problems in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process always have a ripple effect for Jordan. Correspondingly, the Jordanian monarchy will have to be especially adept at addressing a number of challenges that will require

wise statesmanship to be combined with reasonable efforts at political modernization and reform.

As the United States copes with ongoing challenges in Iraq and throughout the region, it cannot afford to neglect the interests of its allies along Iraq's borders including Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Jordan. Of these states, Kuwait and Jordan have often been most directly influenced by Iraqi events in previous historical eras.<sup>5</sup> Jordanian leaders usually display a keen understanding of Iraqi political dynamics because of a history of economic and other ties between the two states and because Jordan's survival has often depended heavily on the efficiency of its intelligence service in assessing and countering threats to regime survival. Jordanian views on Iraq are often informed by a solid understanding of Iraqi issues based on a longstanding interest in Baghdad's political and economic actions and are therefore always worthy of serious consideration. The continuing overlap between a number of U.S. and Jordanian goals for Iraq and the region often present a useful backdrop for U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East.

### **Nature of the Jordanian Monarchy.**

Jordan was established as a British-supported administrative entity in 1921 and as a British League of Nations' Mandate in 1923 in the aftermath of World War I. It originated as Transjordan, an artificial state with long straight borders and few natural frontiers except the Jordan River, which was used as the boundary with the Palestinian mandate.<sup>6</sup> Transjordan was created out of the "unallocated" parts of the Palestinian mandate east of Jordan River in former territory of the Ottoman Empire on the initiative of key British leaders including

Colonial Secretary Winston Churchill.<sup>7</sup> The United Kingdom placed Transjordan under the administration of Abdullah bin Hussein who was given the title of emir (usually translated as prince). Emir (later King) Abdullah had been a British ally during World War I and was viewed by London as a useful partner to help maintain its influence in the region.<sup>8</sup> As the first leader of Transjordan, Abdullah received a British subsidy for administration and seeking the loyalties of local tribes. British army officers were also sent to Transjordan to provide the nucleus of a more modern military to be created from the tribal forces loyal to the new emir.<sup>9</sup>

Transjordan became formally independent in May 1946, at which time Abdullah assumed the title of king. King Abdullah led Transjordan (re-named the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan in 1949) until his assassination in 1951 in Jerusalem by a Palestinian gunman.<sup>10</sup> Transjordan under Abdullah fought in the 1948-49 Arab-Israeli war, with its military doing far better in the fighting than the other Arab forces committed to the conflict. An Arab-Israeli armistice signed in April 1949 left the Transjordanians in control of the eastern part of the city of Jerusalem and the West Bank of the Jordan River. King Abdullah announced the planned annexation of these regions into his kingdom on October 20, 1949. He also changed the country's name, and granted full Jordanian citizenship to West Bank Palestinians. No other Arab state recognized this Jordanian annexation as legal, and there were serious but unsuccessful efforts to expel Jordan from the Arab League for seizing what the other Arab states widely viewed as Palestinian territory.<sup>11</sup> King Abdullah responded that the area was in danger of being seized by the Israelis unless it was protected through unification with Jordan (which had security ties with the United

Kingdom). The West Bank, nevertheless, was captured by the Israelis in the June 1967 Six Day War and, after a series of diplomatic setbacks, the Jordanians renounced all “legal and administrative ties” to this territory in favor of the Palestinians on July 31, 1988. Despite losing the West Bank and East Jerusalem, more than half of Jordan’s current population is composed of Jordanians of Palestinian origin, who dominate the private sector of the economy.<sup>12</sup>

Following King Abdullah’s assassination, his son, Prince Talal, became king but proved unable to govern effectively due to deepening schizophrenia. In 1952, Prince Hussein acceded to the throne at age 18, replacing his father who sought medical treatment abroad.<sup>13</sup> King Hussein thus began what was to become 46 years in power in which the political identity of modern Jordan was formed. Throughout his life, King Hussein’s foreign policy remained consistently friendly to the West, involving a special relationship with the United Kingdom which after 1956 was overshadowed by ties to the United States.<sup>14</sup> Jordan also sought good relations with the Arab states but faced consistent problems with more leftist Arab regimes such as Egypt under President Gamal Abdul Nasser.<sup>15</sup> Despite Amman’s participation in the 1967 War, Jordanian relations with Israel were generally much better than those of any other Arab state with the brief exception of Egypt, which entered into a 1979 peace treaty with Israel.<sup>16</sup> Jordan, which has a history of strong informal relations with Israel, established its own peace treaty with the Israelis in October 1994.<sup>17</sup> The Jordanian peace with Israel was often “warmer” than the Israeli-Egyptian relationship, involving more economic and political cooperation. When King Hussein attended the 1996 funeral of assassinated Israeli Prime Minister

Yitzhak Rabin, he referred to the Israeli leader as “a brother” and incurred considerable criticism for doing so.<sup>18</sup>

King Hussein died on February 7, 1999, after a long struggle with cancer, leaving Jordan without the leader who had come to epitomize the state. Moreover, in a startling January 1999 revision to the line of succession, Prince Abdullah, the king’s oldest son was selected by King Hussein to become monarch rather than the king’s younger brother Hassan ibn Talal who had been crown prince since 1965. This change was made only 2 weeks before King Hussein’s death in apparent response to his fear that Hassan would permanently move the line of succession to his own branch of the family.<sup>19</sup> King Abdullah II (hereafter King Abdullah), therefore, unexpectedly assumed the Jordanian throne at the age of 37 after a career as an army officer in which he had risen to the rank of Brigadier General and commanded the Jordanian Special Forces Brigade.<sup>20</sup> His formal coronation as king took place on June 9, 1999, despite holding actual power since February of that year. Although Abdullah’s knowledge of military and security issues is impressive, his lack of political experience in 1999 and rise to the throne at a relatively young age caused some concerns in Jordan and internationally. Prince Hassan was widely considered a “deputy king” who had been groomed to be head of state for over 30 years.<sup>21</sup> The sudden change of plans could have caused serious problems in a number of other Arab countries, but the Hashemites would not allow a dynastic issue to become violent or even to be aggressively disputed in public. Since the startling events of 1999, Prince Hassan has continued to live in Jordan and has made a special effort to display his continuing loyalty and subordination to King

Abdullah. He has publicly stated that he believes that “primogeniture is the right of the head of state in the Hashemite context” and that Abdullah’s succession “was in a sense a return to normalcy.”<sup>22</sup>

In an assessment that would be difficult for a knowledgeable person to dispute, author Alan George maintains that, “King Abdullah presents not so much as a monarch but as an approachable, plain speaking, down to earth and even slightly self-effacing professional army officer.”<sup>23</sup> Some of his critics like to suggest that Abdullah spoke English better than Arabic in his initial public addresses as king.<sup>24</sup> If so, his problems with formal spoken Arabic were rapidly overcome, although King Abdullah has clearly experienced a close relationship with the West in a region where such ties are sometimes looked upon with suspicion. In addition to having a British mother, the king received much of his early education in the United Kingdom (at the Saint Edmonds School in Hindhead) and the United States (at two schools in Deerfield, Massachusetts). As a young man, Abdullah was admitted to the United Kingdom’s Royal Military Academy at Sandhurst and upon graduation commissioned as a second lieutenant in the Jordanian Army.<sup>25</sup> He was then seconded to a British Army unit for a tour of duty as a “Reconnaissance Troop Leader” serving in both England and what was then West Germany.<sup>26</sup>

King Abdullah came to power while Jordan was mourning a leader known to be a giant of Arab politics and diplomacy. Unable to move directly into his father’s role as a major regional and international political figure, King Abdullah focused on more prosaic but nevertheless vital economic goals. This was probably an unavoidable choice since in 1999 around a third of the national budget was taken up by repayments on a

\$6.8 billion foreign debt, and approximately one-third of the population was living below the poverty line.<sup>27</sup> Independent sources estimated that unemployment ran as high as 27 percent in the same time frame.<sup>28</sup> In addressing these concerns, King Abdullah has been an advocate of what he calls “Jordan First” policies which include a special emphasis on improving the economic welfare of Jordanian citizens.<sup>29</sup> The king has stated that throughout his career in the Army, he encountered Jordanian soldiers who sought out military service as a way to escape from oppressing and often rural poverty.<sup>30</sup> He maintains that he wishes to make a difference on this issue for reasons of personal compassion as well as regime stability.

The “Jordan First” approach appears to define priorities in a way that allows the king to more easily justify Jordan’s cooperation with the West and its willingness to continue normal relations with Israel (to the extent domestic and regional conditions permit). It has also been viewed by critics as a way for Jordan to distance itself from regional problems involving the Palestinians and Iraqis. President Bashar Assad of Syria in a March 12, 2006, statement suggested that “such a slogan is a separation from the Arab [identity] and pan-Arab nationalism.”<sup>31</sup> He also stated that “first slogans effectively mean that the United States, Israel, or any other non-Arab country comes second.”<sup>32</sup> The Jordanian leadership hotly denies this interpretation of its policies, and Syrian-Jordanian relations were strained for some time after Assad made his comments, although they had improved significantly by 2007.<sup>33</sup>

King Abdullah’s westernized outlook appears to have been reinforced by the values he developed as a modern military leader including a focus on discipline, efficiency, and organization. Consequently, King

Abdullah's approach to leadership has sometimes caused problems in his interaction with Jordanian tribal leaders. Some such leaders have reportedly complained that he is abrupt and has lost touch with tribal customs and traditional values.<sup>34</sup> King Abdullah starts and ends meetings on time, which is not always viewed as appropriately respectful by more traditional Jordanian leaders. The king's patience for time-consuming social events which help bind the tribal leaders to the monarchy is also much more limited than that of his father. Some tribal leaders have reportedly been hopeful that Abdullah might eventually be replaced by his younger brother, Prince Hamza. Hamza became crown prince in 1999 when Abdullah became king, but was removed from this position in late 2004.<sup>35</sup> Hamza bears a much stronger physical resemblance to King Hussein than does Abdullah, and he seems to have a similar personality and manner. Rather opaquely, King Abdullah explained his decision to remove Hamza from the role of crown prince by suggesting that the position of crown prince was an encumbrance in his performance of other duties.

The overwhelming significance of the monarchy in Jordanian political life, and especially the longtime reign of King Hussein, is a vital component of the Jordanian national identity, even among Jordanians of Palestinian origin. Moreover, Jordan has often had much better and less repressive government than many of the other states in the region. The security services, while efficient and tough, are not a notable presence in the everyday life of ordinary citizens. Despite this success, the Jordanian leadership is aware that the current political system cannot continue indefinitely without greater political reform and more democratic input. Consequently, the challenge of opening the

political system, while avoiding the dangers of doing this in a hurried, poorly-planned, or sloppy manner, is one of Jordan's greatest contemporary challenges.

### **The Modern Jordanian State and the Issues of Governance and Opposition.**

The Jordanian monarchy dominates the state but also considers itself to be modernizing and reformist. Some foreign observers view Jordanian political reform as little more than an exercise in image management by the ruling elite, but this interpretation is a serious oversimplification.<sup>36</sup> Although the Jordanian leadership is concerned about how the regime is viewed by the West and other sources of foreign aid, carefully managed and halting political reform in Jordan is part of an overall strategy of meeting public expectations to ensure regime survival. Such reform tends to expand during times of economic discontent but contract when the government is seeking to implement what it views as essential but unpopular policies such as the 1994 Jordanian-Israeli peace treaty and various forms of Israeli-Jordanian cooperative behavior based upon that treaty. Additionally, Jordanian leaders are currently interested in underscoring an image as democratic reformers in order to avoid running afoul of the post-September 11, 2001 (9/11), U.S. demands for increased democracy in the Middle East. Unlike Saudi Arabia and Egypt, the Jordanians have managed to deflect most U.S. media and other U.S. criticism by stressing their interest in reform and by serving as an especially important partner in efforts to stabilize the Middle East during its current era of turbulence.<sup>37</sup>

Jordan's most democratic institution is the Parliament which was created in its modern form by

the 1952 Constitution, although there have been earlier parliaments (which have sometimes been dissolved for significant periods of time) as far back as 1929. The current Parliament's lower house is elected and includes 110 (formerly 80, then 105) members who hold office for a 4-year term. The Upper House is appointed by the king and has 55 members. The Parliament was eventually suspended and temporarily replaced with a National Consultative Council in the aftermath of the June 1967 Arab-Israeli War when Israel seized control of the West Bank.<sup>38</sup> The Jordanian leadership resorted to this expediency because it was not prepared to hold elections with the West Bank under Israeli occupation. It was also unwilling to conduct East Bank-only elections, which might have appeared too accepting of the Israeli occupation of what Amman then viewed as Jordanian land. This reason for reluctance about elections disappeared when King Hussein severed legal and administrative ties with the West Bank in 1983. After a hiatus of over 22 years, Jordan held parliamentary elections in 1989 achieving a 70 percent turnout.<sup>39</sup>

Jordanian democratic and economic reform made significant strides from 1989 until 1994. Reform slowed down in 1994 as a result of King Hussein's decision to implement several unpopular policies which he felt were necessary for the country's well-being. These new courses of action could be reasonably expected to garner intense opposition in any sort of strengthened Parliament elected under more democratic election laws than those in place at that time. The most controversial of these policies was the establishment of the Israeli-Jordanian Peace Treaty signed in the presence of U.S. President Bill Clinton in October 1994. Another unpopular policy change was the progressive hardening

of Jordanian policies toward Saddam Hussein's Iraq after the 1991 Gulf War.<sup>40</sup> In the short-term aftermath of the 1991 fighting, the Jordanians limited their criticism of Saddam due to widespread public sympathy for the defeated Iraqis and because Amman was not yet certain of the long-term consequences of antagonizing its larger neighbor. This situation had changed by 1996 when the Jordanian government granted asylum to Saddam's defecting sons-in-law, Lieutenant General Hussein Kamil and Lieutenant Colonel Saddam Kamil, and their families. The Hussein Kamil defection was especially serious since he was the former Minister of Industry and Military Industrialization (MIMI) and began providing some of Iraq's most sensitive military secrets to United Nations (UN) officials investigating Saddam's weapons of mass destruction (WMD) program.<sup>41</sup>

In assessing the viability of Jordan's parliament, it is also important to consider the issue of political parties. Jordan has over 30 political parties, most of which are small and inconsequential. These parties came into existence following the passage of the 1992 Political Parties Act.<sup>42</sup> Some Jordanians appear reluctant to become involved with political parties out of a concern that the government views political activity and activism unfavorably.<sup>43</sup> The concern is often most pronounced among the many Jordanians who work in public sector jobs. The most notable exception to this trend involves members of the Islamic Action Front (IAF), which is Jordan's only important political party at the present time. The IAF is the political arm of the Jordanian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood and serves as the major opposition party to many government policies including support for U.S. efforts in Iraq and the continuation of normal relations with

Israel. It takes pride in identifying itself as a “loyal opposition.”<sup>44</sup> It also has the potential to strengthen, while some of the smaller parties may be forced to dissolve under a new more stringent law that requires a political party to achieve some minimal indicators of viability in order to enter the electoral process. These requirements include a minimum number of 500 founding members, with members drawn from at least 5 of the country’s 12 governorates.<sup>45</sup> The smaller parties are calling upon the king to seek the revocation of this new, tougher version of the political parties law.<sup>46</sup>

The Jordanian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood was established in Amman in 1945.<sup>47</sup> Throughout its history, the Brotherhood in Jordan has been willing to tolerate or even support the Hashemite monarchy and was often opposed to groups that constituted a much more serious threat to the throne. In the 1950s and 1960s, the Islamists were a useful counterweight to leftist Arab nationalists opposed to the monarchy and Palestinian nationalists who wanted to overthrow the Hashemite government in order to wage war against Israel without the constraints imposed by the Jordanian leadership.<sup>48</sup> The government was therefore often more interested in co-opting rather than suppressing those Islamists who did not show an interest in overthrowing the monarchy. The Muslim Brotherhood had relatively good relations with King Hussein at various points in time such as the 1960s when traditional forces seemed to be under assault by republican leaders such as those of Egypt, Syria, and Iraq. Egyptian President Nasser’s anti-Jordanian rhetoric also coincided nicely with his unyielding campaign against the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, helping to push both sides towards each other. On at least one occasion in the 1960s, the Jordanian government and the Islamists cooperated to organize

an Amman demonstration protesting the Nasser government's repression of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood as well as the execution of several of its members.<sup>49</sup>

Following a decision to outlaw political parties in a 1957 crackdown on anti-government activity, Jordan's Muslim Brotherhood was seldom seriously repressed because it was not generally viewed as subversive. Thus, the organizational foundation for the IAF's success was set during the time frame when the Muslim Brotherhood grew and developed, while competing opposition movements faced serious harassment by the security forces. When parties were legalized once again in September 1992, the Brotherhood was consequently well-prepared to use the IAF to fill the former political void and establish itself as the leading Jordanian party.<sup>50</sup> The IAF was also one of the primary vehicles for expressing public discontent over the Jordanian-Israeli peace treaty and the subsequent normalization effort. Unfortunately, for the Islamists, the IAF lost 6 seats out of 22 in the 1993 elections due to new electoral laws and vigorous government restrictions of political activity imposed in the aftermath of the Madrid peace talks with Israel, which the IAF opposed.<sup>51</sup> It boycotted the 1997 elections because of constricting electoral rules, but in 2003 it ran 30 candidates and won 17 seats in the expanded 110-seat lower house.<sup>52</sup>

The IAF's emergence as Jordan's dominant opposition party has often been viewed with alarm within Western circles due to its opposition to the West and Israel as well as various extreme statements and actions by some of its members (such as when two IAF members of Parliament paid their respects at a funeral service for Abu Musab Zarqawi as discussed later in this monograph). While such concerns are

reasonable, the regime sees a strong positive side to political participation by the Muslim Brotherhood and the IAF. In particular, these groups have provided a credible, nonviolent political opposition that has traditionally defended and been loyal to Hashemite rule.<sup>53</sup> The viability of the Muslim Brotherhood has occasionally undercut the rise of much more radical Islamic opposition groups such as the Liberation Party which was outlawed in 1956 and severely repressed thereafter.<sup>54</sup> Additionally, the IAF appears to be handicapped by factionalism. Thus, ironically, the Jordanian political system may work best for the regime when the Muslim Brotherhood and IAF are legal but never quite strong enough to gain real power. These groups naturally have no interest in playing this government-scripted role indefinitely. Instead, for the last decade, the IAF has used legislative action, boycotts of some elections, charges of rigged voting procedures, and appeals to international organizations and the world media as ways to pressure the Jordanian government to open up the system and give them a serious opportunity to share power indefinitely.<sup>55</sup>

The Jordanian opposition has frequently complained about the press and election laws being designed to ensure the dominance of pro-government forces in Parliament. The ways in which the government draws Parliamentary districts has often been a particular source of opposition concerns since traditional pro-monarchy rural districts are over-represented at the expense of urban areas that are often the strongholds of Islamist power.<sup>56</sup> Tribal candidates can also work around bans on electioneering before the appointed time by flowery media descriptions of how and why a particular tribal candidate was chosen to run for public office. In 1997 this disagreement reached an

impasse, and the IAF chose to boycott parliamentary elections. They have periodically threatened to repeat this tactic but have only occasionally done so. In July 2007 the IAF announced that it was boycotting local elections, but the government said it was too late for such a decision and the names of IAF candidates who had filed remained on the ballot.<sup>57</sup>

There are also occasional delays in elections due to regional and domestic problems. In recent years, King Abdullah dissolved the Parliament in June 2001 and announced plans for new elections in November 2001.<sup>58</sup> Partially because of the crisis in Middle East politics that began on 9/11, these elections did not take place as scheduled. A new election was held in June 2003. About two-thirds of the delegates elected to the lower house were pro-establishment supporters of the King. Of the 30 seats it contested in the elections, 17 went to the IAF.<sup>59</sup> In addition to the IAF members, a limited number of independent Islamists were also elected in 2003. Most Jordanian parliaments tend to be dominated by tribal candidates and other strong supporters of the king's policies who invariably do well. While charges that the electoral rules have been designed to favor such candidates are correct, their strength also has a great deal to do with the enduring importance of tribal and family ties in "locking in" votes. Officials of the IAF have told the Jordanian media that they are "very aware" that they cannot displace the power of the tribes.<sup>60</sup> Most recently, the king dissolved the Parliament in August 2007 in preparation for new elections.<sup>61</sup> Problems between the monarchy and the IAF were already at a high point when this announcement was made, and the IAF dangled the possibility that they would again boycott these elections. In late September the Islamists backed

away from this threat “despite [what they called] a plethora of good reasons to boycott the election.”<sup>62</sup>

### **The Jordanians and Saddam’s Iraq.**

Iraq was created by the British from former Ottoman territory after World War I under a League of Nations’ mandate in a process similar to the creation of Jordan. Iraq, however, contained a much more diverse population by ethnicity and Islamic sect than did Jordan.<sup>63</sup> Emir Abdullah’s brother Feisal, who had initially been placed on the throne of Syria, was driven from that country by the French and subsequently accepted a British invitation to become the king of Iraq (subject to a “well-managed” referendum of the Iraqi public).<sup>64</sup> Relations between Iraq and Jordan remained cordial so long as both countries were ruled by Hashemite monarchies through the mandate period and after formal independence. The situation changed with the overthrow of Iraq’s Hashemite monarchy in a bloody 1958 coup during which King Hussein’s friend and cousin, 23-year-old King Feisal II was murdered.<sup>65</sup> This turn of events quickly poisoned the Iraqi-Jordanian relationship, and Brigadier Abdul Karim Qassim, the Iraqi coup leader, was referred to by Jordanian leaders as the “new Hulagu” after the Mongol leader who sacked Baghdad in 1258, and thus became a central villain in Arab history.<sup>66</sup> Despite these problems, Jordanian political isolation was so serious in this time frame that diplomatic relations with Iraq were reestablished in October 1960.<sup>67</sup>

Restored Iraqi-Jordanian ties did not lead to normal relations between the two countries, but the propaganda war between Amman and Baghdad ended as both nations struggled to cope with more

serious subversive threats from Egypt. Iraqi-Jordanian relations also did not improve substantially under a series of Iraqi governments that took power sequentially following Qassim's February 1963 assassination. When a Ba'athist coup (the second since 1963) took place on July 17, 1968, there seemed little reason to expect an improvement in Jordanian-Iraqi relations over that of previous post-Qassim regimes. It was also unclear if the new regime would remain in power long enough to establish a stable foreign policy before the Iraqi political system generated a new coup. Nevertheless, this regime was eventually to display an unusual degree of durability. Unlike the 1963 Iraqi Ba'ath regime, which survived less than a year, this new government was to display considerably more longevity due mostly to the efficiency, pragmatism, and brutal ruthlessness of one of its rising leaders, the hard-working and security-minded Saddam Hussein.

Jordanian relations with Iraq's second Iraqi Ba'ath regime did not start out well, but improved dramatically in the late 1970s as Iraq attempted to assert a leadership role in the Arab World following Egypt's ostracism over its 1979 peace treaty with Israel. Saddam Hussein, who was by then the *de facto* strongman of Iraq and about to become president, made his first visit to Jordan in 1979, and Iraq provided some limited aid to Jordan following that visit.<sup>68</sup> This aid, along with other Arab support, was designed to enable Jordan to resist U.S. pressure to involve itself in the Camp David process on terms most of the Arab World did not consider acceptable. The real turning point for Jordanian-Iraqi relations, nevertheless, occurred in the early stages of the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq War. Jordan, like the United States, was deeply concerned that Tehran would defeat the Iraqis and emerge from the victory more empowered to

export its radical ideology throughout the Middle East. Iraq, for its part, was interested in rapidly improving its relations with Jordan for a variety of reasons related to the war effort against Iran.

During the course of the war, Iraq's few ports came under repeated air attack from Iran, and the Jordanian port of Aqaba became an indispensable point of entry for military supplies that were then transported overland by truck to Iraq.<sup>69</sup> King Hussein also made a strong effort to convince Saudi Arabia and the other Arab Gulf countries to support Baghdad as the only available bulwark against Khomeinism. Jordan sent a handful of volunteers to participate in noncombat military missions, and Jordanian generals may have consulted with Iraqi senior officers about war strategy.<sup>70</sup> When the Iran-Iraq war ended in summer 1988, Jordan was one of Baghdad's closest allies. Two years later, this comfortable arrangement became a serious problem as Amman faced a major foreign policy crisis resulting from Saddam Hussein's unexpected and reckless invasion of Kuwait in August 1990.

Jordan condemned the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, but it also opted to remain outside of the U.S.-led multinational coalition against Saddam Hussein, instead urging a peaceful solution to the crisis. Many Jordanians, particularly Palestinian-Jordanians, viewed Saddam as an Arab champion willing to stand up to the West and to Israel. Additionally, Jordanian economic ties to Iraq were important for keeping Amman's economy afloat. In a particularly useful observation, Marc Lynch has noted that, with the exception of Kuwait and Iraq, no state was more deeply affected or directly threatened by the 1990-91 Gulf crisis than Jordan.<sup>71</sup> Prior to the invasion, Jordan had enjoyed excellent relations with Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and

the United States. Now Jordan tried without success to find a formula to avoid war and continue acceptable relations with Iraq and at least some of its adversaries. The mutually exclusive demands of Baghdad and the U.S.-led coalition nevertheless made such compromise impossible. After war broke out on January 16, 1991, the king continued efforts to work with all parties to end the conflict, and on February 6, he made a particularly tough speech denouncing U.S. policy toward Iraq. This speech followed the U.S. destruction of Jordanian fuel trucks mistaken for military targets entering Iraq through the Amman-Baghdad highway.<sup>72</sup> In his remarks, King Hussein condemned the war and called for a renewed effort to seek a diplomatic solution. The king's harsh tone was widely viewed as excessively pro-Saddam in the West and Saudi Arabia.

Jordan maintained acceptable economic relations with Iraq following the 1991 war, although Saddam's post-1991 status as an international outlaw prevented the restoration of friendly pre-war political relations.<sup>73</sup> Jordan continued to receive some free and the rest subsidized oil from the Baghdad regime in return for ongoing trade relations in other commodities during Baghdad's period of regional and global isolation. Just prior to the U.S.-led 2003 invasion of Iraq, Iraqis were purchasing around \$500 million in Jordanian goods annually.<sup>74</sup> The Jordanian trucking industry depended greatly on Jordanian-Iraqi trade which involved food, medicine, and other humanitarian goods allowed under the UN embargo of Iraq.<sup>75</sup> The United States did not oppose such Jordanian-Iraqi economic ties and instead chose to understand Amman's continuing economic problems and especially the need to obtain oil wherever it could be found. The Jordanian-Iraqi oil and trade agreements were also never challenged

by the UN sanctions committee which officially “took note” of the transactions, with language that was widely regarded as tacit approval.<sup>76</sup> Not surprisingly, the Jordanian government asserted that they met the requirements of all pertinent UN resolutions, and their trade agreements with Iraq were therefore legal.<sup>77</sup>

As noted earlier in this monograph, the implementation of a new and harder line Jordanian political policy towards Iraq is most usefully dated to August 1995, when King Hussein granted asylum to Hussein Kamal and Saddam Kamil, the defecting sons-in-law of Saddam Hussein.<sup>78</sup> This policy of moving away from Iraq was not popular with the Jordanian public, but King Hussein viewed such actions as essential to restore good relations with the United States and Saudi Arabia. The suffering of Iraqi citizens under UN sanctions was well-known to the Jordanian public, and many blamed the United States rather than Saddam for the continuation of such sanctions for years after the war. Moreover, many Jordanians did not view Saddam as totally lacking in redeeming qualities. In particular, Saddam’s continuing pro-Palestinian rhetoric was often well-received by large portions of the Jordanian public and especially those of Palestinian origin. Moreover, Iraqi payments to the families of Palestinian suicide bombers killed in attacks against Israel were viewed as a humanitarian gesture by significant elements within the Jordanian public. By contrast, most Israelis and Americans viewed such payments as an incitement to murder.<sup>79</sup>

In the lead up to the March 2003 U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, King Abdullah strongly urged the United States not to go to war, warning of a potential post-invasion civil war that could spread to involve Iraq’s neighbors, including Jordan.<sup>80</sup> U.S. political leaders were not

dissuaded and instead sought Jordanian support for tough anti-Saddam policies that would culminate in the 2003 invasion. In noting the importance of the U.S. pressure Jordan was experiencing, former Foreign Minister Jawad Anani stated that “Jordan has learned the hard way from the previous war, and this time his Majesty believes Jordan should not be exposed to another bitter experience.”<sup>81</sup> The Jordanian leadership also saw the pre-war time frame as a particularly bad point to antagonize the United States. In addition to the concerns noted above, the Jordanians seemed to fear that the United States intended to install Ahmad Chalabi as the new leader in Iraq or that he would at least play a highly prominent role in Iraq’s future. This type of development would have been a serious problem for the Jordanians since their relations with Chalabi were abysmal following the failure of the Chalabi-controlled Jordanian-based Petra bank.<sup>82</sup> This institution collapsed in a scandal costing Jordanian stockholders and investors around \$1 billion. Chalabi was convicted in *absentia* of embezzlement by a Jordanian Court and sentenced to 20 years in prison.<sup>83</sup> While the Jordanians would almost certainly have made efforts to improve their relations with Chalabi had he taken power in Iraq, such an effort would have been long and painful, with no guarantee of success.

The U.S.-led war against Iraq began in March 2003. Three days after the U.S. launched its attack, Jordan expelled five Iraqi diplomats, accusing them of espionage. One of the Iraqis was further accused of being involved in a foiled terrorist attack within Jordan.<sup>84</sup> Jordan also allowed a limited and temporary U.S. and possibly British military deployment on its soil in 2003 for participation in the war. The U.S. presence has been confirmed by Ambassador L. Paul

Bremer in his memoirs, *My Year in Iraq*.<sup>85</sup> In describing this relationship, Bremer stated that Jordan, "had helped us considerably during the invasion, allowing Coalition Special Operations forces to operate from its territory," although he does not mention numbers.<sup>86</sup> Former Central Command Commander General Tommy Franks has stated, "We flooded Western Iraq with hundreds of special operators [from Jordan] to secure the Scud fields."<sup>87</sup> In *Cobra II*, Michael Gordon and retired U.S. Marine Corps Lieutenant General Bernard Trainor stated that the United States and Jordan engaged in lengthy negotiations over the numbers and types of U.S. forces to be stationed in Jordan to support the hostilities. Gordon and Trainor suggest the eventual agreed upon troop strength was 5,000 U.S. soldiers, down from a U.S. request to put 14,000 troops in the kingdom.<sup>88</sup> This number would have included Patriot air defense missile crews as well as the troops General Franks describes above. Prior to the war, both Amman and Washington publicly acknowledged that *Patriot* systems had been sent to Jordan to safeguard that country against attacks by Iraq's suspected surface-to-surface missiles, including Scuds.<sup>89</sup> A missile defense network set up in such a way could also be used to protect Israel, a much more likely target had Saddam been able to retain some sort of residual Scud missile capability (which proved not to be the case).

Shortly after the 2003 invasion of Iraq, there were large anti-American demonstrations in Amman and other Jordanian cities. Tens of thousands of Jordanians demonstrated peacefully in these events.<sup>90</sup> On some occasions, there were also short-lived riots and clashes with the police. Angry antiwar reporting by the Jordanian media was permitted and, in combination

with other Arab news outlets, threatened to increase domestic anger over Jordan's ties to the West. Under these circumstances, it appeared possible that the regime might have felt the eventual need for a harsh crackdown to control the potential for increased violence on the street.<sup>91</sup> The rapid defeat of Iraqi conventional forces and the fall of Baghdad were consequently viewed with relief in Amman. Despite their previous warnings of possible Iraqi civil war, at least some Jordanians now viewed the worst dangers associated with the war to be over. Nevertheless, early decisions by coalition authorities worried the Jordanians, including the dissolution of the Iraqi army and the sweeping process of de-Ba'athification.<sup>92</sup>

After the 2003 ouster of Saddam Hussein, King Abdullah gave Saddam's daughters, Raghdad and Rana, and their nine children refuge in Jordan, despite the women's continued public defense of their father's actions.<sup>93</sup> Since neither daughter was complicit in Saddam Hussein's crimes, this decision on asylum was presented to the world as a reasonable act of Arab chivalry, despite some Iraqi anger over the decision.<sup>94</sup> Saddam oldest daughter, Raghdad, nevertheless, became more controversial in 2007 when the Iraqi government requested her extradition for allegedly providing funds to the insurgency in Iraq.<sup>95</sup> The Jordanians showed no interest in such an extradition and tended to view the Iraqi justice system as hopelessly biased against Sunni Arabs.<sup>96</sup> This evaluation is not unreasonable, and allowing the Iraqi justice system to arrest Raghdad would have been deeply unpopular among Jordanians.<sup>97</sup> In an interpretation that often disturbs Westerners, some ordinary Jordanian citizens (and various other Sunni Muslims) viewed the execution of Saddam Hussein as an act of pro-Iranian

Shi'ite revenge against an Arab nationalist leader rather than the long overdue punishment of a murderous tyrant.<sup>98</sup>

## **The Future of Jordanian-Iraqi Relations.**

As Iraq's post-Saddam era unfolds, Jordanian leaders cannot avoid being haunted by the possible emergence of either a hostile Iraq or an Iraq in chaos. In either of these cases, a dramatic increase in terrorism and cross border crime would almost certainly become major problems. Moreover, Jordanian-Iraqi trade could be expected to collapse in both of these cases. The Jordanians are also concerned that a chaotic Iraq would continue to produce waves of refugees in addition to the approximately 750,000 Iraqis who have already fled to Jordan at the time of this writing. Jordan probably has a stronger stake in a stable, united, and prosperous Iraq than any other Arab state except Kuwait. To the extent possible, Amman has therefore consistently supported U.S., international, and Iraqi efforts to achieve these goals. Both before and after Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, Iraq was Jordan's most important export market.<sup>99</sup> Currently, U.S. and international contractors with business in Iraq often stay at Jordanian hotels, and the Jordanian port of Aqaba is extremely busy with imports to be sent to Iraq.<sup>100</sup> In keeping with this continuing involvement with Iraq, Jordan was the first Arab country to appoint a fully accredited ambassador to Iraq, doing so in August 2006.<sup>101</sup>

Although Jordan is deeply interested in a stabilized Iraq, it has remained unwilling to send combat forces there in the absence of a larger Arab effort. Such a move has remained too sensitive regionally and domestically for Jordan to implement while other Arab nations are

refusing to do so. The Jordanians did, nevertheless, transfer military equipment, including armored vehicles, to the new Iraqi army that was formed in the aftermath of Saddam's removal from power.<sup>102</sup> While most of this equipment was comprised of older systems being phased out of the Jordanian inventory, it was still useful to the Iraqis since they were critically short of armored vehicles for use by the new army. After Saddam's ouster, some Iraqi military officers also received training in Jordan, including those forming the nucleus of Iraq's new air force.<sup>103</sup> The Jordanian Army also established an Army field hospital in Fallujah in the immediate aftermath of Saddam's ouster.<sup>104</sup> Sadly, the Jordanians serving in this unit faced insurgent attacks early in the post-Saddam era despite their status as Arabs, Sunni Muslims, and humanitarian medical personnel.<sup>105</sup>

More significantly, King Abdullah made a September 29, 2003, offer to train 30,000 Iraqi police, with this number subsequently adjusted upward to 35,000.<sup>106</sup> These police candidates were given an 8-week course in police skills and procedures in classes of 1,500 at the Jordanian International Police Training Center near the village of Mawaqqar, 20 miles east of Amman.<sup>107</sup> The chief U.S. Administrator in Iraq, L. Paul Bremer, called this effort "the world's largest police training program," and the United States quickly agreed to provide funding for the program.<sup>108</sup> About 50,000 police cadets were trained at this facility from 2004 until 2007, thus exceeding the initial projections for the numbers to be trained under the program.<sup>109</sup> The final class of Iraqi police cadets graduated in summer 2007, although limited numbers of Iraqi police candidates may still receive specialized training in Jordan. Otherwise, Iraqi police training has

transitioned to facilities inside Iraq.<sup>110</sup> Jordanian police trainers continue to be involved in the training program despite the change in location.<sup>111</sup> Additionally, the Mawaqqar facility remained in use for some months after the departure of the police classes, although its mission changed to the training of Iraqi prison guards, as will be discussed later in this monograph.

While the police training program was valuable in providing police skills and instilling professionalism, this effort was not enough to reform and rebuild an efficient and professional Iraqi police force in the short term.<sup>112</sup> The January 2005 election of highly sectarian leaders in Iraq complicated police professionalization, since various internal security figures sought to bring their favored militiamen into the interior ministry. Militiamen associated with the most important Shi'ite political parties were consequently favored for admission into the Interior Ministry police forces in a number of instances, despite a lack of police training.<sup>113</sup> Once Jordanian-trained recruits returned from Mawaqqar, they were often caught up in problems associated with the militia power struggle for control of the police. The recruits were often resocialized into patterns of choosing sectarian loyalties over professionalism if they were hired and then retained for police service at all (which some were not).<sup>114</sup> Efforts at reform may eventually roll back this practice to some extent, although the ultimate value of the Jordanian training program remains uncertain. If the Iraqi police system remains problematic, it will apparently do so because of the divisive nature of Iraqi politics rather than for any shortcomings attributable to the Jordanian training program.

In addition to its concerns about Iraqi instability, the Jordanian government has shown a consistent apprehension over the fate of Iraq's Sunni Arabs.<sup>115</sup>

Any Jordanian efforts to support Iraq's Sunnis and present their concerns to the international community are especially well-received by the Jordanian public. To these ends, Amman has attempted to advise the United States on ways to reduce tensions with Iraq's Sunni Arabs. These measures have included urging the United States to reach out to Sunni leaders and longstanding efforts to convince the United States to ease the de-Ba'athification process, which many Jordanians view as vindictive and anti-Sunni.<sup>116</sup> The Jordanian leadership also meets with some of Iraq's Sunni Arab leaders including tribal leaders who have ties to Jordanian tribes.<sup>117</sup> Under some circumstances, Jordan might also be expected to approach Iraq's Shi'ite dominated government to express concerns it holds about the treatment of Iraqi Sunni Arabs.

As noted earlier, mainstream Islamists who do not engage in terrorism are an important force in Jordan, and organizations such as the Muslim Brotherhood and the IAF have serious followings. In the event of an Iraqi civil war, these groups will undoubtedly sympathize with Sunni Iraqis and will pressure the Jordanian government to at least passively support the actions of these types of individuals. The prestige of Jordan's Islamic organizations would also rise due to their vociferous opposition to U.S. policy, which they would blame for any Iraqi civil war and possibly for creating the conditions that led to any atrocities by Shi'ite organizations attacking Iraqi Sunnis. Mainstream Islamists could become a much more serious domestic center of political power and could perhaps constrain the ability of the monarchy to conduct the pro-Western foreign policy with which it is most comfortable. King Abdullah's continuing efforts to appear optimistic about Iraq's future may be related to this dynamic.

Quite apart from security issues, Jordan hopes to receive a reliable supply of discounted Iraqi oil once again, and has received encouraging signs from the Iraqi government on this issue.<sup>118</sup> Jordanian hopes for consistent near-term shipments of oil from Iraq nevertheless appear problematic despite such encouragement. On September 4, 2007, somewhat gratuitously, the Iraqi Ambassador to Jordan stated that ongoing violence in his country could delay some planned shipments of oil for an unspecified amount of time.<sup>119</sup> Yet, this reality has not clearly ended the possibility of a steady oil supply from Iraq. On an especially encouraging note, the first shipment of Iraqi oil sent to Jordan in 4 years arrived on September 30, 2007. The shipment consisted of eight oil trucks which were loaded in Kirkuk and delivered their cargo to Jordan's Zarqa oil refinery.<sup>120</sup>

### **The Iraqi Refugee Issue.**

One of the most important issues dominating contemporary Iraqi-Jordanian relations concerns Iraqi refugees who have sought asylum in Jordan to escape from the ongoing warfare in their own country. As of late 2007, there were at least 2.4 million refugees who had fled Iraq for various sanctuaries abroad, as well as around 2 million internally displaced Iraqis.<sup>121</sup> Jordan traditionally has been welcoming to Iraqis, and around 400,000 Iraqis were living there just prior to the invasion.<sup>122</sup> This figure had swelled to between 700,000 and one million by mid-2007.<sup>123</sup> In May 2007, King Abdullah stated that the number was around 750,000, but this was basically an informed guess that is now dated.<sup>124</sup> The only country hosting more Iraqi refugees than Jordan is Syria, with over one million

Iraqi expatriates within its borders.<sup>125</sup> In autumn 2007, Damascus dramatically toughened the regulations that limit Iraqis from entering Syria.<sup>126</sup>

Following Saddam's fall, a significant number of the earliest refugees with some skills or resources were able to enter Jordan. In particular, large elements of the Iraqi middle class and many wealthy Iraqis chose to live in Jordan rather than remain in their homeland under the exceptionally dangerous post-2003 conditions.<sup>127</sup> These people had the economic means to flee, and chose to do so. Additionally, many prosperous Iraqi professionals also fled because they and their families had become kidnapping targets for lawless elements seeking high ransoms.<sup>128</sup> Some of the Iraqis in Jordan would like to immigrate to Europe, Canada, or elsewhere, but the overwhelming majority of those that are interested in migrating to a third country have been unable to do so.<sup>129</sup> Around 30,000 Iraqi refugees have been given UN asylum seekers' documents, but most have been unable to find another country to accept them. To complicate matters further, Iraqis who receive such documentation are no longer eligible for a Jordanian work permit that allows them to engage in lawful employment in Jordan.<sup>130</sup> Thus, they wait and sometimes work without permits and the legal protection that accompanies such documentation.<sup>131</sup>

The influx of Iraqi refugees is often viewed as responsible for major distortions in the Jordanian economy. Housing has become a particularly serious problem, and the cost of rent has risen dramatically in many instances.<sup>132</sup> This change has occurred because of increased demand for housing and also because of widespread real estate speculation spurred by the influx of Iraqis.<sup>133</sup> The problems with housing costs come at an unfortunate time for less prosperous Jordanians since the price of gasoline and petroleum products

has also continued to rise due to the loss of some free oil from the Saddam regime with the rest of the oil imported from Iraq at subsidized rates.<sup>134</sup> The effects of the refugee influx are not all negative, however, since spending by wealthier and middle class Iraqis have tended to prop up the hotel, restaurant, and other service industries. Some economists further suggest that the impact of Iraqi refugees on the economy has been exaggerated, and that the dramatic escalations in prices are more attributable to other factors and most especially the dramatic escalation in the price of oil imports for Jordan since 2003.<sup>135</sup>

Iraqi refugees have also placed a strain on the ability of the Jordanian government to provide public services and most notably education. Until August 2007, only Iraqis holding residency permits were allowed to enroll in public schools. This policy was then changed in response to humanitarian concerns, and all Iraqi children became eligible for free public education in Jordan.<sup>136</sup> Jordanian Ministry of Education officials initially projected that the reforms would allow around 50,000 Iraqi students to enter the educational system at all grades, in addition to the 14,000 Iraqis that had already been incorporated into Jordanian schools.<sup>137</sup> These numbers did not immediately materialize. Preliminary estimates suggest that only 8,000-10,000 additional Iraqi children were registered for school, although more are expected to be forthcoming.<sup>138</sup> Iraqi children will receive all of the same privileges as Jordanian children, including meals provided under the School Nutrition Program.<sup>139</sup> In August 2007, the United States announced that it would contribute \$30 million to assist Jordan, Syria, and several other states in their efforts to provide educational facilities to Iraqi refugee children following a UN appeal for approximately

\$130 million to defray these educational expenses.<sup>140</sup> The European Union (EU) is also in discussions with Amman about increasing aid to help Jordan cope with refugee problems.<sup>141</sup> Such aid would complement the 265 million euros in overall aid to Jordan which the EU has already budgeted for the 2007-2010 time frame.<sup>142</sup>

Jordanian policies for granting visas became more stringent following the November 2005 bombings in Amman (discussed below).<sup>143</sup> Young Iraqi men are often particularly suspect and likely to be turned away at the Jordanian border or at Jordanian airports and ports of entry. Jordan now fears an even greater number of refugees in the event of chaos in Iraq. A 2007 Jordanian law requires Iraqi refugees entering Jordan to carry a G-Series passport.<sup>144</sup> This is a new type of passport that Iraqis must obtain in Baghdad and cannot be issued on the border. It replaces the old S-Series passport which the United States and United Kingdom have stopped recognizing because it is easily forged.<sup>145</sup> In October 2007, the Jordanian Health Ministry also required travelers from Iraq to have a stamp on their entry card attesting that they are free from cholera, which has become an increasing problem in Iraq.<sup>146</sup> All of these restrictions have helped to limit the number of Iraqis able to enter Jordan under current circumstances.

To protect itself from being further swamped with refugees, Jordan appears to be considering putting troops inside Iraq's western desert along their mutual border should various extreme scenarios play out.<sup>147</sup> Jordanians worry that new waves of refugees with few skills or resources will be difficult to manage and may support themselves through crime if no other options are available.<sup>148</sup> In conversations with journalists, Jordanian officials have suggested that in a full-scale Iraqi civil war Jordanian troops might be deployed

across the Iraqi border as far west as Rutbah, around 40 miles inside Iraq. This would be done to ensure that refugee needs are met in Iraq itself, and that additional waves of refugees do not overwhelm Jordanian border security.<sup>149</sup> Such a contingency would undoubtedly be coordinated with the United States if it occurred while significant numbers of U.S. troops are still in Iraq.

## **Is Terrorism Moving to Jordan from Iraq and Can It Be Stopped?**

Jordan has a long history of being victimized by attacks from both state-sponsored terrorist groups and by terrorist organizations operating without such state support.<sup>150</sup> In the 1960s a major ideological divide among Palestinian guerrilla groups involved whether or not it would be necessary to overthrow conservative Arab governments (viewed as insufficiently committed to the Palestinian Revolution) as a preliminary step to defeating Israel by striking from the territory of its Arab neighbors. Jordan, which has the longest border with Israel of any neighboring state, became a special target of groups accepting the latter school of thought. Radical Palestinian leader George Habash's Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) maintained a formal political platform calling for the overthrow of the Hashemite government. The PFLP platform included language that the road to Jerusalem was through Amman, and that Amman needed to become an "Arab Hanoi" to confront and defeat the Israelis.<sup>151</sup> While such organizations were extremely dangerous in the 1960s and helped to inspire the Jordanian civil war in 1970-71, they have now been replaced by new threats.

Most recently Jordan has faced challenges from radical Islamist terrorists including members of al-Qaeda.<sup>152</sup> Until his 2006 death, the key terrorist figure that dominated the shadow war between Jordan and al-Qaeda was Abu Musab al Zarqawi (actual name: Ahmad Fadel Khalayla). While Zarqawi is known to Westerners primarily for his actions in Iraq, he was Jordanian by birth and also had a long history of terrorist activities in Jordan. Zarqawi began his career in Jordan as a small-time criminal who, lacking options, fled to Afghanistan to become part of the anti-Soviet jihad. While he arrived there too late to fight against the Soviet military, he did participate in operations against the pro-Soviet Afghan government that had been left behind after the Soviet withdrawal. In Afghanistan, Zarqawi became involved with al-Qaeda and was mentored and supported by terrorist mastermind Abu Zubaydah.

The first Jordanian veterans of the Afghanistan war began to return to Jordan in September 1991, with Zarqawi arriving in the kingdom in early 1993.<sup>153</sup> By this time, he was a skilled and ardent terrorist and was therefore placed under close surveillance by the Jordanian security forces. Unsurprisingly, Zarqawi was arrested and convicted by a Jordanian court in 1994 for possessing bombs and mines without a permit and for using a false passport.<sup>154</sup> In the course of his trial, Zarqawi quickly admitted possessing the weapons, but his co-defendant, Abu Mohammad al Maqdisi, also credibly claimed the bombs and mines were for use against the “Israeli enemy” and not to strike against government or other institutions in Jordan.<sup>155</sup> The court did not view this argument as an extenuating circumstance and found Zarqawi and Maqdisi guilty. Zarqawi was then imprisoned for 5 years (of a 15-year

sentence), but was pardoned in March 1999 as part of a far-ranging amnesty following King Hussein's death.

King Abdullah announced the amnesty which included Zarqawi shortly after coming to power, after being lobbied by the IAF and Muslim Brotherhood to include Islamist prisoners in any show of mercy.<sup>156</sup> Such amnesties are sometimes viewed as an Arab tradition when a new king comes to power, provided the prisoners have a reasonable hope of being redeemed. Under King Hussein, amnesties and pardons were a continuing feature of Jordanian governance when applied to those who were not viewed as a threat to the public or to national security. King Hussein often presented himself as personally stricken for the families of wayward Jordanians and stressed that he hoped for their relatives' release as soon as this could responsibly be done. While the king did not manage to enjoy 47 years in power without some skill at political drama and public relations, this imagery still presents a somewhat reassuring contrast to other regional states that are known for long and brutal imprisonment for political dissenters.

The idea of welcoming opponents back to the Jordanian family after they are punished is also an important aspect of Jordanian political culture and a strategy for regime maintenance. King Hussein provided numerous examples of this approach, including pardoning those who attempted to overthrow him. One such individual, General Ali Abu Nuwar, fled Jordan in 1957 after being implicated in an apparent coup attempt. He was later pardoned in the mid-1960s and appointed Jordanian ambassador to France in February 1971.<sup>157</sup> On another memorable occasion in late 1996, the king personally drove dissident Leith Shubeilat to his mother's house from prison fol-

lowing a royal pardon.<sup>158</sup> Shubeilat had served 11 months of a 3-year prison sentence for slandering the king and royal family in a series of lectures criticizing Jordanian-Israeli contacts since 1948. The idea behind King Hussein's approach appears to have been to show generosity to those who have tasted punishment and thereby allow them other options besides being lifelong enemies. Secondarily, such an approach might at least cause them to consider moderating their commitment to future legal or illegal opposition. Some nonviolent regime opponents like Shubeilat were pardoned multiple times. King Abdullah, although following in his father's footsteps with the March 1999 pardon, was later to regret deeply his generosity toward Zarqawi. He may also have blamed some of those who advised him to grant pardons to men that in retrospect were committed terrorists who could never have reconciled with the Jordanian government or lived a peaceful life as a Jordanian citizen.

Shortly after Zarqawi was released from prison, he became involved with his former al-Qaeda mentor Abu Zubayda who was the chief planner for what later were to become known as the millennium plots.<sup>159</sup> They involved strikes against sites in Jordan and Los Angeles International Airport. Striking at Jordanian tourist sites would have met the twin terrorist goals of killing Western nationals and undermining future tourism which serves as one of the economic mainstays of the Jordanian economy and therefore the regime. In his memoirs, former CIA Director George Tenet (1997-2004) notes his strong concerns about the anticipated millennium attacks by al-Qaeda as intelligence started to become available in the lead up to the planned strikes.<sup>160</sup> Tenet also stated that he was exceptionally pleased by U.S.-Jordanian intelligence cooperation,

and he complements the head of the General Intelligence Directorate (GID) by name in his book.<sup>161</sup> Tenet suggests that the millennium attacks might not have been so effectively thwarted if such cooperation had not been forthcoming. This was also a relationship that benefited the Jordanians since they were a central target of the attacks.

Zarqawi's organization was also involved in the October 2002 murder of Laurence Foley, a U.S. diplomat in Amman, although Zarqawi himself was not in Jordan at the time.<sup>162</sup> Earlier, in summer 2002, Zarqawi entered Iraq to coordinate with anti-Saddam Kurdish extremists from the *Ansar al Islam* party in northern Iraq. He was, therefore, well-positioned to begin working with other anti-American terrorists and insurgents once the anti-U.S. insurgency began in 2003. Unsurprisingly, Zarqawi was quickly identified as the mastermind behind the August 7, 2003, truck bomb attack against the Jordanian Embassy in Iraq that left 18 dead and 57 wounded.<sup>163</sup> The car bomb itself was rigged by Abu Umar al Kurdi, a member of the Zarqawi organization who was later captured and confessed.<sup>164</sup> At the time, this strike was the worst attack on a nonmilitary target in Iraq since the fall of Saddam's regime. It also clearly illustrates the trend in which al-Qaeda of Iraq was continuing to plan acts against Jordanian targets despite its overarching focus on fighting in Iraq. By April 2004, the Jordanian leadership was making its own view of al-Qaeda clear by sentencing eight terrorists to death for the murder of Foley. Six of the militants, including Zarqawi, were sentenced to death *in absentia*.<sup>165</sup> Two others were in Jordanian custody and later hanged.<sup>166</sup>

A number of Jordanian radicals left their own country (and especially the towns of Salt and Zarqa)

to fight U.S. troops in Iraq or Afghanistan following the U.S. interventions in these countries. In addition to their commitment to the struggle against the West, Jordanian extremists also sought to leave their homes and travel to Iraq for a variety of reasons, including problems with surveillance by local authorities, a lack of acceptance by their home communities (usually due to their time in prison for violent offenses), and a lack of economic opportunities in Jordan. Problems within Jordan, nevertheless, did not constitute their only challenges. Since 2004 the flow of terrorist recruits from Salt and Zarqa into Iraq has faced serious interdiction efforts by the Jordanian authorities.<sup>167</sup> Some Jordanian radicals still managed to get through to Iraq, and at least one was reported to have conducted a high profile suicide bombing that killed 125 people in Hillah, almost all of whom were Shi'ite police and army recruits.<sup>168</sup>

It might also be noted that the Jordanian government has made recent, serious efforts to relieve poverty in the region around Zarqa and Salt (which are about 25 miles apart), perhaps in partial response to the problem of terrorism. A centerpiece of this effort is the construction of modern and affordable housing near Zarqa with funding from Saudi Arabia. Current plans call for the "King Abdullah bin Abdul Azziz al Saud Residential City," which is designed to house around 370,000 Jordanian citizens, and will include parks, banks, mosques, and cultural and recreation centers. The total project is expected to cost almost \$2 billion.<sup>169</sup> Jordanian banks will provide loans to purchase these homes at subsidized rates of interest. Additionally, the project is expected to create numerous local jobs and attract investments.

In addition to attempts to overcome poverty that may breed terrorism, Amman has made a continuing

effort to help destroy the Zarqawi group and other anti-Jordanian terrorist organizations. In an August 2004 announcement, Jordanian and Iraqi authorities stated that they had concluded an agreement to share intelligence on cross border crime including terrorism, kidnapping, smuggling, drug trafficking, and money laundering.<sup>170</sup> According to some journalistic sources, Jordan has an effective intelligence gathering operation inside of Iraq.<sup>171</sup> Moreover, Jordanian intelligence is sometimes reported as having especially useful connections to some of Iraq's large Sunni tribes.<sup>172</sup> The Jordanians, as noted earlier, reported foiling an average of two terrorist plots a week during this time frame.<sup>173</sup> According to a September 1, 2006, speech by General Intelligence Director al Dhahabi, "The al-Qaeda organization is the biggest threat to our Jordanian security. We foiled many of the schemes that targeted Jordan. But we do not announce these schemes."<sup>174</sup>

Jordan has consistently sought close ties with the Iraqi government as a way of combating the threat of anti-Jordanian terrorism. Senior Jordanian officials maintain that enhanced intelligence exchange is a key goal in their relations with Iraq.<sup>175</sup> Obtaining terrorism-related intelligence from Iraqi sources is probably a key Jordanian goal, but it is doubtful that Amman wants to share much of its sensitive intelligence in return. Jordanian leaders are concerned about the security of information passed to the Iraqis and have warned them that their security forces have been extensively infiltrated by Shi'ite militias with ties to Iranian intelligence. In response to Jordanian concerns, Iraqi National Security Advisor Muwaffaq Rubaie stated, "We listened to these complaints. We are realistic and know that the Iraqi security forces have seen some penetrations and excesses."<sup>176</sup> While

the Iraqi acknowledgement of their security problems is admirable, it has probably not encouraged senior Jordanian intelligence officials to share information with such a problematic ally unless there are specific and compelling reasons to risk doing so.

Jordanian authorities also allege that Zarqawi was responsible for an elaborate 2004 plot to attack Jordan's GID, the Prime Minister's Office, and the U.S. Embassy in Amman with three trucks laden with 20 tons of explosives and toxic chemicals. Jordanian sources maintain that such an attack could have killed 80,000 people, although other sources consider this claim to be highly exaggerated, if not fanciful.<sup>177</sup> The plot was foiled by the security forces before it was undertaken. Some of the money associated with this operation may have been provided by Syrian donors who probably believed that their funds would be used to conduct operations against U.S. troops in Iraq.<sup>178</sup> When asked much later about Syrian money going to anti-Jordanian terrorists, the head of GID refused to comment, thereby adding to the speculation that already exists on this issue.<sup>179</sup> More recently, Damascus has every reason to crack down on such transactions due to Syrian political isolation resulting from the strong and widespread suspicion that Damascus was involved in the February 14, 2005, assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafic Hariri.<sup>180</sup> This isolation could become even more severe and perhaps regime threatening should evidence emerge of Syrian involvement in terrorist activity against Jordan and other regional targets. Moreover, both countries will continue to need a great deal of international assistance to help them cope with Iraqi refugees, and they probably would be more effective in lobbying for this aid if they cooperate in doing so.

The next high profile terrorist attack in Jordan was headline grabbing, but also considerably more modest in scale and potential impact. On August 19, 2005, terrorists fired three *Katyusha* rockets at U.S. naval vessels using the Jordanian port of Aqaba. All of these rockets missed the U.S. warships, although one landed nearby on the Israeli city of Eliat, another struck near a Jordanian military hospital, and a third landed on a Jordanian military post, killing one Jordanian soldier and wounding another.<sup>181</sup> Even if the ships had been hit, it is difficult to imagine that the projectiles would inflict more than very limited damage, although the possibility of a few casualties was clearly present. Two al-Qaeda affiliates separately claimed responsibility for the attack. These were Zarqawi's group and the Abdullah al-Azzam Brigades of al-Qaeda in the Levant and Egypt.<sup>182</sup>

The most serious al-Qaeda terrorist strike in Jordan came on November 9, 2005, with nearly simultaneous suicide bombings directed against three large Western chain hotels in Amman. These were the Radisson SAS, the Grand Hyatt, and the Day's Inn hotels. Only four Americans and two (non-Jewish) Israelis were killed in the attacks despite being the professed terrorist targets. The majority of the victims were attending a wedding party at the Radisson SAS for a Jordanian couple of Palestinian origins.<sup>183</sup> The bride's father and nine other family members died in the attack. More people might have been killed had a fourth suicide bomber been able to blow herself up in the attack on the Radisson. This woman's explosive suicide belt failed to detonate, and she was apprehended by Jordanian police attempting to flee the scene.<sup>184</sup> Elsewhere in Amman, Palestinian Authority Lieutenant General Bashir Nafe, the head of West Bank security, was killed in the Grand Hyatt

hotel explosion.<sup>185</sup> The internationally known film director, Moustapha Akkad, along with his daughter, was also killed at the Radisson SAS hotel.<sup>186</sup> Iraqi terrorists were used for the assaults in response to the almost certainly accurate al-Qaeda belief that violence-oriented Jordanian radicals were so well-known to the authorities that they would have a much greater likelihood of being arrested.

While Zarqawi's focus on Jordan may have been more personal than strategic, he did feel the need to justify his actions on ideological and strategic grounds. In particular, he maintained that by striking at Jordan he is also hurting Israeli interests. In defending himself against criticism of the strikes against the Amman hotels, the Zarqawi network described the hotels as "playgrounds for Jewish terrorists" that were frequented by Israeli intelligence agents.<sup>187</sup> Zarqawi also accused the Jordanians of hiding the casualties of Israeli and American agents.<sup>188</sup> Such claims were unconvincing, if not absurd, to most Jordanians. Making matters worse for himself with public opinion, Zarqawi claimed he would continue to operate in Jordan. He stated in an audio recording posted on a jihadist website that his group would attack tourist sites throughout Jordan and would behead King Abdullah.<sup>189</sup> Such barbaric statements had no appeal among any Jordanians except those already completely estranged from their government.

In response to the hotel attacks, at least 200,000 people demonstrated in Amman against Zarqawi. Protesters carried banners with the names of their tribes indicating that they were from every part of Jordan.<sup>190</sup> Leaders of the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood also denounced Zarqawi, although they stressed that such renunciation did not imply a lack of support for

what they called the Iraqi “resistance movements” fighting U.S. and coalition troops there. According to Brotherhood spokesman Salim al Falahat, “resistance alone is not enough to get a good conduct certificate,” indicating the Brotherhood’s view that anti-American combat in Iraq (which they praise) did not compensate for acts of terrorism in Jordan.<sup>191</sup> Additionally, Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas stated that, “Those [terrorists involved with the attack] are affiliated to obscurity, blackness, and sabotage. May God curse them from this day until Judgment Day.”<sup>192</sup> If Zarqawi hoped to suggest that the hotel strike were in solidarity with Palestinian interests, he did not convince the leadership of the Palestinian Authority. It is, however, doubtful that he would care much about what Abbas said since the Palestinian leader had also been condemned as a traitor by al-Qaeda for a variety of reasons, including his willingness to negotiate with Israel.

The Jordanians responded to the hotel attacks almost immediately with King Abdullah’s appointment of his National Security Advisor, Marouf al Bakhit, as prime minister with instructions to wage “all out war” against terrorists targeting Jordan.<sup>193</sup> Earlier in his career, Bakhit served in the Army for 35 years, rising to the rank of Major General. Much of his time in the military was spent on intelligence duties, and while a Major General he served as the head of the GID.<sup>194</sup> The Jordanians also stated that November 9, 2005, was their 9/11. Since emerging as the al-Qaeda leader in Iraq, Zarqawi is not known to have planned attacks in any other countries than Jordan and Iraq, although some operations in Europe and North Africa were inconclusively linked to him before other contradictory evidence came forward and seemed to discredit this

linkage.<sup>195</sup> While Zarqawi was certainly interested in global jihad at a theoretical level, Jordan was an especially important, personal, and immediate target.

According to the *New York Times* and other sources, King Abdullah and Prime Minister Bakhit responded to the hotel attacks by creating a new intelligence unit called the “Knights of God.” This organization was designed to hunt down hostile terrorists, and particularly the Zarqawi network outside of Jordan.<sup>196</sup> Although Jordan was reported to be cooperating with U.S. efforts against Zarqawi prior to the hotel bombings, journalistic sources claim that this effort went into high gear after the November 2005 strikes. According to the *Los Angeles Times*, Jordanian intelligence operatives “flooded [Iraq] cultivating informants and working the periphery of the Zarqawi network to find ways into the organization.”<sup>197</sup> This operation was conducted with the permission of the Iraqi government. In addition to the overarching need to respond to “Jordan’s 9/11,” King Abdullah may have felt some need to atone for pardoning Zawqawi as part of the 1999 general amnesty.

Zarqawi was killed on June 7, 2006, in a U.S. air strike against his headquarters about 30 miles north of Baghdad. The Jordanians have strongly implied that this attack would not have been possible without their own tenacious intelligence work to track him down. Zarqawi’s death was an important tactical victory in the struggle against al-Qaeda, but the Jordanians remain concerned about long-term trends involving the growth of terrorist organizations near their borders. The professionalized terrorists that are emerging from the Iraqi crucible will probably be much more dangerous than those that came out of Afghanistan in the 1990s due to their need to master a more complicated set of

skills to survive and flourish in Iraq.<sup>198</sup> Iraqi extremists with a regional agenda may rise to prominence in a civil war and would probably view Jordan as a key target beyond Iraq for both its strategic location and its cooperative relationship with the United States.

Jordanian public opinion, in contrast to government policy, is sometimes more sympathetic to the “Iraqi resistance” than to the U.S. “occupation forces” and, at least until the hotel bombings, appeared less attuned to the need to fight al-Qaeda.<sup>199</sup> These sentiments became even more pronounced after the 2004 Abu Ghraib scandal. Although Zarqawi lost most of his popularity in Jordan due to the hotel bombings, a minority continued to respect his willingness to strike at the U.S. presence in Iraq.<sup>200</sup> Two Members of Parliament from the Islamic Action Party carried this viewpoint to an extreme by visiting a funeral tent honoring the “martyrdom” of Zarqawi and offering condolences.<sup>201</sup> Both of these parliamentarians were subsequently arrested on charges of fueling national discord and inciting sectarianism. After these arrests, some Jordanian officials associated with the Crown were more inclined to express doubts about the patriotism of the IAF and the Muslim Brotherhood. In response to this problem, various Islamist leaders felt compelled to sign loyalty statements which pledged fidelity to the Hashemite throne and renounced religious extremism.<sup>202</sup> King Abdullah eventually pardoned the detained deputies following the intercession of a moderate former leader of the IAF.<sup>203</sup>

When the United States departs Iraq, Jordan will be faced with a number of difficult decisions about how to address the danger of terrorism originating from Iraq. The Jordanians have strong ties to a number of Sunni tribes and political groups which may aid them

in addressing potential problems with terrorists. These links include ties with militant and anti-Western Sunni organizations which are also opposed to al-Qaeda, such as Iraq's Association of Muslim Scholars.<sup>204</sup> Supporting these Sunnis with funds, weapons, intelligence support, or training has remained out of the question with U.S. forces in Iraq. The possibility of Jordanian allies killing American troops would deter the Jordanians from supplying such groups at the present time. After a U.S. withdrawal, it is conceivable that the Jordanian leaders may provide intelligence and material support to anti-al-Qaeda Sunni groups, as a way of protecting their eastern border and ensuring that Sunnis can defend themselves from the Iranian dominated Shi'ite government that Amman fears. The United States has also reached out to Sunni Arab tribal leaders in Iraq so long as those groups are known to oppose al-Qaeda.<sup>205</sup> Some Sunni militias that have previously killed Americans but are currently willing to fight al-Qaeda are now viewed acceptable U.S. allies due to the serious need to decisively defeat al-Qaeda in Iraq.<sup>206</sup> After a U.S. withdrawal, Jordan too might find a need to work with some unsavory allies in Iraq to ensure that future attacks along the lines of November 2005 do not occur. The United States should not hurry to be disapproving of such links and understand Jordan's need to protect its own survival while remembering the importance of Jordanian survival to the overall interests of the United States in the Middle East.

### **Jordan, Iran, and the Iraqi Shi'ites.**

Although they reluctantly acquiesced to the 2003 U.S. plan to oust Saddam, the Jordanians were deeply concerned about hostile forces coming to

power in post-Saddam Iraq. As far back as July 2003, King Abdullah stated that the United States seemed insufficiently concerned about Iranian domination of Iraqi Shi'ites leading to an Islamic republic in Iraq.<sup>207</sup> In December 2004, he expressed further concern in an interview with the *Washington Post* and charged the Iranians were preparing a massive intervention in the Iraqi elections by arranging for more than 1 million Iranians to cross the border to vote as Iraqis. In the same interview, King Abdullah also expressed concern about the rise of what he called a "Shi'ite Crescent" running from Iran to Lebanon, and dominated by Tehran.<sup>208</sup> This concern was not simply a slip and was reiterated and emphasized by other senior Jordanian officials following the king's remarks. In January 2005, Jordanian Foreign Minister Hani Mulki, in an obvious allusion to Iran, stated, "Religion and politics are two different things, and when we talk about a Shi'ite crescent, we mean a non-Arab religious rule."<sup>209</sup> The Jordanians feared pro-Iranian politicized Shi'ites and were not anti-Shi'ite in general or on religious grounds. Nevertheless, Shi'ite unhappiness about such statements was probably unavoidable.

King Abdullah tried and failed to convince the United States to postpone the January 30, 2005, vote in Iraq on the basis of the accusations noted above. It is not clear if he fully believed the charges about Iranian intervention in the Iraqi elections or if he was simply concerned that pro-Iranian Shi'ite parties would win the election.<sup>210</sup> In unusually blunt language, the king asserted that, "If Iraq goes Islamic republic, then yes, we've opened ourselves to a whole set of new problems that will not be limited to the borders of Iraq. I'm looking at the glass half-full, and let's hope that's not the case. But strategic planners around the world have

got to be aware that is a possibility.”<sup>211</sup> It should also be noted that in the aftermath of the January 2005 election, both the Iraqi Independent Electoral Commission and UN election observers found only limited problems with fraud that in no way approached the level of corruption which concerned King Abdullah.<sup>212</sup>

In some respects, King Abdullah’s concerns about Shi’ites and his apparent fear of a pro-Iranian Shi’ite bloc in the Middle East are counterintuitive. King Abdullah and the other members of the Jordanian Royal Family are Sunni Muslims, but they are also members of the Hashemite family, and, as such, claim direct family descent from the Prophet Mohammed. This lineage has salience to a variety of Muslims, and it is well-received by many Shi’ites worldwide. The original break between Shi’ites and Sunnis occurred because of the Shi’ite belief that members of the Prophet’s family are the most legitimate leaders of the Muslim community. While contemporary Shi’ites do not seek their leadership from the family of the Prophet, they have often displayed respect for the Hashemites. King Hussein’s widow, Queen Noor, for example, has commented on Shi’ite esteem for the Hashemite family.<sup>213</sup> King Abdullah makes the same type of claims stating “We [the Hashemite family] have a very warm and very special relationship with Shi’ites not just in Iraq but also in Iran and elsewhere throughout the Islamic world.”<sup>214</sup>

Jordanian concerns about Iran are not new and involve serious disagreements that date back as far as the 1979 Iranian revolution. In the aftermath of the proclamation of the Islamic Republic, the Iranian revolutionaries accurately but stridently referred to King Hussein as “the shah’s old friend” and with considerably more venom also described him as the

“shah of Jordan.”<sup>215</sup> King Hussein’s total support of Baghdad during the Iran-Iraq war, along with the post-1979 Iranian hatred for the institution of monarchy, further poisoned relations. Iran also deeply disapproves of Jordan’s long history of pro-Western policies and the 1994 peace treaty with Israel.

A number of Iraqi Shi’ites also feel that the king has severely strained his relationship with their community by his continuing expressions of concern about the dangers of a powerful Iranian-backed Shi’ite leadership in Baghdad. His inflated charges of Iranian voting in Iraqi elections were viewed as a challenge to the legitimacy of a government reflecting Shi’ite dominance of Iraqi political institutions. Moreover, some Iraqi Sunnis believe that their numbers have been consistently undercounted, and that there are far more Sunni Arabs in Iraq than generally acknowledged. If one assembled these charges into a comprehensive view of the Iraqi situation, a conspiracy theory easily falls into place in which the Sunni Arabs have been deprived of their rightful place as Iraq’s leaders by a Iranian/Iraqi Shi’ite plot. Such fantasies do little to improve the prospects of Sunni acceptance of a majority rule system, and many Iraqi Shi’ites consequently view Jordan as playing a counterproductive role on this issue. Nevertheless, most Iraqi Sunnis do not need input from a foreign leader to help them reach the conclusion that they would prefer not to be ruled by a Shi’ite-dominated government.

Iraqi Shi’ite leaders have also charged that Jordan is being too passive in interdicting radicals on their way to Iraq to join with al-Qaeda or the Sunni insurgents fighting Iraq’s Shi’ite-dominated government. As noted earlier in this monograph, a suicide bomber apparently from Salt, Jordan, attacked a clinic in Hillah,

Iraq, in February 2005 where a number of mostly Shi'ite military inductees were killed while receiving physical examinations. In Iraq, the attack was widely blamed on Jordanian negligence in allowing known radicals to cross the border because they were interested in removing them from their own country.<sup>216</sup> Shi'ite Iraqis have also noticed that Jordanian newspapers continually praise the Iraqi Sunni resistance forces and seldom seem bothered by acts of terrorism directed against Shi'ite civilians.<sup>217</sup> This insensitivity may not be surprising since Jordan has almost no Shi'ite citizens. An estimate of 4,000 is considered generous.<sup>218</sup> There are however a reported 200,000 Shi'ite refugees in Jordan, out of a total of 750,000 to 1,000,000 total Iraqi refugees there.<sup>219</sup>

Despite the important and longstanding differences between the two states, Jordan and Iran continue to maintain a wary dialogue, and King Abdullah has cautiously called for the enhancement of Jordanian-Iranian ties. This approach relates to the fundamental Jordanian principle of engaging and trying to influence all states in the region when this is possible. King Hussein repeatedly throughout his rule made the point that "engagement is not endorsement," and that unexpected opportunities may arise in dealing with potential adversaries.<sup>220</sup> This approach was forged in the early years of his monarchy when Jordan was deeply isolated within the region and struggled to maintain ties to even the most untrustworthy of enemies, including Brigadier Qassim's Iraq. It is a policy approach which King Abdullah has been quick to adopt.

Jordan has expressed its opposition to a U.S. or Israeli air strike against Iran out of a concern that such an action may provoke more instability and terrorism within the region, especially in neighboring Iraq. In

a May 2007 meeting with Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki, King Abdullah stated that “We do not allow anybody to use Jordan’s soil or aerospace to attack Iran.”<sup>221</sup> While the Iranians may take some limited comfort from such assertions, they are experienced enough to know that such pledges can be reevaluated at critical times. In this regard, King Abdullah found it useful and easy to state in 1999 that “Jordan will not serve as a springboard for any hostile actions against Iraq,” but this pledge was not the last word on the issue.<sup>222</sup> Jordan’s public opposition to military attacks against Iran may, nevertheless, not be tested since a U.S. military strike on that country is described by U.S. leaders as a “last resort” to deal with the Iranian nuclear program.<sup>223</sup> Such a strike would severely aggravate already pressing problems in Iraq, making it much more difficult for the United States to achieve any kind of success there.<sup>224</sup> Moreover, even if the United States chose to do this at some future point, it is not clear that Jordan would be a reasonable point for logistical support.

The Jordanians do not appear to believe that an Iranian-Israeli nuclear exchange is likely or should be treated as a serious threat to Jordanian national security should Tehran obtain a nuclear weapon.<sup>225</sup> Amman also appears sincere in its opposition to a strike against Iran on the grounds that such an attack will unleash extremist fury against the pro-American regimes in the region.<sup>226</sup> This perspective is interesting since an Iranian strike against Israel may have equally dire implications for the Jordanians as the Israelis should Israel’s ability to deter Iran ever break down. Iranian missiles are known for frequent failures or at least limited successes during testing, and their ability to strike distance targets with accuracy is still

uncertain.<sup>227</sup> This limitation would concern Amman in a situation of escalating tension since Israel is both small and adjacent to Jordan. Further complicating matters, Jordan, unlike Israel, is not moving toward a comprehensive and layered missile defense system which would stand an excellent chance of intercepting incoming Iranian missiles.<sup>228</sup> Moreover, first generation nuclear weapons are in many circumstances likely to kill a large proportion of their victims with radioactive fallout. Nuclear missile strikes against Israeli cities could create fallout that kills a large number of Jordanians and Palestinians as well as Israelis. The Israelis can at least attempt to minimize their casualties with their expanding program of civil defense.<sup>229</sup> Jordan has nothing like this, nor are serious civil defense facilities available in the Palestinian territories.

### **U.S.-Jordanian Military Relations and the Invasion of Iraq.**

U.S.-Jordanian military relations and arms sales relations have gone through occasional difficulties, as well as eras of substantial agreement and cooperation. In 1957 the United States initiated its first program of limited military assistance to Jordan to supplement the continued military support Amman received from the United Kingdom. The U.S.-Jordanian military relationship expanded dramatically in August 1964 when Washington agreed to supply Jordan with M-48 tanks and armored personnel carriers. Later, in February 1966, the United States added F-104 fighter aircraft to the arms package.<sup>230</sup> By early 1967, the United States had joined the United Kingdom as one of Jordan's primary arms suppliers. The United States agreed to this expanded military relationship with Jordan as the British role in the region declined and due

to a fear that Amman would seek and receive Soviet aid in the absence of continuing Western supplies of arms.<sup>231</sup> Moreover, the Jordanian army was viewed as a valuable partner for the United States due to its historical role as one of the best and most professional military forces in the Middle East and its potential as a force for maintaining stability in Jordan and containing radical Palestinian nationalism in the turbulent period following the June 1967 Arab-Israeli war. Some of the Palestinian guerrilla organizations were then seeking “a state within a state” in Jordan while others were seeking to overthrow the Hashemite government.

Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, Jordan supplemented military assistance from Western countries with financial support for military modernization from Arab oil-producing states, and especially the conservative Gulf monarchies. Such support allowed Jordan to make a number of major purchases including U.S.-made F-5 fighter aircraft to replace the F-104s, U.S.-made M-60 tanks, and a stationary *Hawk* anti-aircraft missile defense system to protect Amman. Deliveries of some of these systems were slowed under the Carter presidency because of important U.S.-Jordanian differences over the Camp David Peace Process.<sup>232</sup> An even more serious interruption of arms supplies occurred after the 1991 Gulf War when the United States suspended the approximately \$55 million in aid provided to the Jordanians.<sup>233</sup> Moreover, Jordan’s conservative Gulf backers were equally angry with Amman for its wartime policies and thus were unwilling to help Jordan cope with the lack of U.S. military support. Jordan began receiving military aid again after it accepted a 1994 peace treaty with Israel. The United States nearly tripled U.S. military aid to Jordan in 2003 to more than \$1.5 billion.<sup>234</sup>

Jordan does not allow the United States to maintain permanent bases on its soil due to longstanding regional sensitivities about the effects such bases have on national sovereignty.<sup>235</sup> Amman does, however, participate in a variety of recurring joint exercises with the United States, and extensive military cooperation exists between the military components of the two countries. These include Exercise Eager Tiger and Exercise Eager Light which focus on counterterrorism and border security.<sup>236</sup> The U.S. Marine Corps works with the Jordanian military in Exercise Infinite Moonlight and U.S. Special Forces conduct Exercise Early Victor with the Jordanians.<sup>237</sup> While these exercises all occur on Jordanian soil, some other friendly Arab states sometimes participate as well. The Jordanians also participate in multilateral exercises supported by the United States, such as the Bright Star exercises in Egypt. Additionally, British units based in Cyprus usually travel to Jordan every year to train under desert warfare conditions.<sup>238</sup> Jordan has also deployed medical and mine clearance units to Afghanistan to provide symbolic support for the post-Taliban government.<sup>239</sup>

One of the most valuable tasks Jordan has performed in recent decades has involved training and support for friendly Arab officers and soldiers. The Jordanian senior service schools have a number of non-Jordanian Arabs from friendly nations attending courses.<sup>240</sup> Jordan also hosts a number of Arab officers and soldiers at shorter training courses involving important skills including Special Forces operations. According to commander of the Royal Jordanian Special Operations Command Brigadier General Ahmad Sarhan al-Faqeeh, “Jordan has been more or less the main special operations school for many Arab armies.”<sup>241</sup> This role has existed for decades and is a natural niche for the Jordanians to

fill as their Special Forces troops are among the best in the region. Jordan's Special Operations Command was formerly led by King Abdullah, while he served as a brigadier general immediately prior to becoming king in 1999. In the years prior to the 2003 Iraq War, Jordanian Special Forces troops played a leading role in securing the Iraqi border where almost nightly clashes took place between Jordanian forces and Iraqi smugglers. Training Special Forces was also an important way for Jordan to contribute to fighting terrorism in the region in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks. In April 2002, Jordan sent a special forces training unit to Yemen to assist U.S. military instructors training the Yemeni military to fight terrorist groups in that country.<sup>242</sup> Additionally, the Jordanians have trained around 100 officers and soldiers from the post-Taliban government of Afghanistan in special operations and counterterrorist procedures.<sup>243</sup>

While the Jordanian role in training friendly troops is not new, it has clearly received much greater international attention in the aftermath of the efforts to support Iraq's post-Saddam governments.<sup>244</sup> It has also expanded dramatically in recent years thanks to U.S. support including financial backing for the creation of the King Abdullah Special Operations Training Center (KASOTC) in the Yajooz Cliffs about 20 kilometers northeast of Amman.<sup>245</sup> The creation of this center was an important priority for General John Abizaid when he was the Combatant Commander at U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) and is designed to help improve the military skills of Arab students attending courses there.<sup>246</sup> The initial U.S. grant for the center was \$99 million from the U.S. Government, with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers serving as the project contracting agency.<sup>247</sup> The KASOTC is projected to

become fully operational by 2009, and has been training a number of Special Forces and other troops while the facility is being completed.<sup>248</sup> The center functions to train not only Jordanian Special Operations Forces, but also soldiers from a number of other pro-Western Arab nations. This organization is expected to be a major facility in the area that will continue to train both Jordanian and other Arab forces.

When complete, the KASOTC will have housing and dining facilities for 650 people at a time. Training facilities will include a large urban warfare live fire facility which includes simulated homes, shops, embassies, industrial buildings, and palaces. Other skills taught at the center will include counterterrorism, hostage rescue procedures, driving vehicles in a live fire urban environment, and close quarters combat. The Center will also use affiliated facilities at Zarqa with outdoor facilities including a light anti-tank weapon range. Additionally, the Zarqa facility will offer training in sniper activities and infantry marksmanship. There will also be a maritime counterterrorism facility at Aqaba, Jordan's only port.<sup>249</sup>

In addition to hosting the KASOTC noted above, Jordan has maintained a strong presence at the Special Operations Forces Exhibit (SOFEX) which serves as a military trade fair for Special Forces equipment and services. Jordan also hosted SOFEX 2006 which had the theme of "Counterterrorism: United in the Fight against a Common Enemy" in Amman during March 2006. At the conference, a number of Jordanian officials, including King Abdullah and Prime Minister Bakhit, visited various stalls at the exhibition highlighting military technology and services. Prime Minister Bakhit delivered the keynote address at the conference, speaking on the struggle against terrorism.<sup>250</sup> At

SOFEX 2006 there were about 300 special operations and national security exhibitors representing 50 countries.<sup>251</sup>

Jordanian training programs, financed by U.S. funds, have also supported the U.S. “surge” strategy announced by President Bush in January 2007, especially the Baghdad security crackdown. The Jordanians have done this by training about 2,400 new Iraqi prison guards at the Muwaqqar facility in Jordan during the summer of 2007.<sup>252</sup> Iraqi recruits were trained on how to manage prisoners confined in tent cities, which the U.S. military set up around Baghdad as regular prisons were filled to more than capacity. The volume of prisoners was expected to vastly increase as a result of the Baghdad crackdown.<sup>253</sup> The prison system as administered by the Iraqi government is currently ridden with serious problems including brutality and torture, according to a variety of respected nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).<sup>254</sup> It is not clear that the Jordanians or even U.S. forces can inspire Iraqi prison officials and guards to behave in a more professional manner, but any efforts to do so are worthwhile for both human rights and national reconciliation related reasons.

Jordan has also maintained a longstanding intelligence relationship with the United States dating back to the 1950s. The effort to help the Jordanians build a professional and efficient regional intelligence service was a special concern for one of the earliest and most powerful leaders of the CIA Operations Directorate, Frank Wisner.<sup>255</sup> He moved forward with this program to help the Jordanians after obtaining the backing of Director of Central Intelligence Allan Dulles.<sup>256</sup> CIA support for the GID continued for decades after the initial commitment. Moreover, the Jordanians welcomed such help as they often viewed

their intelligence operations as a central pillar for their country's safety in a very dangerous region. Journalistic sources sometimes assess the Jordanian GID to be closer to the United States than other Middle Eastern Intelligence services, including the Israeli Mossad.<sup>257</sup> Jordan has also been reported as having an intelligence exchange program with Israel.<sup>258</sup>

The Jordanian military is also deeply involved with UN and other peacekeeping operations. Such activities often help to advance U.S. foreign policy objectives, and Jordanian peacekeeping forces sometimes support the same missions as U.S. troops, such as in Afghanistan.<sup>259</sup> Jordan has also provided significant numbers of soldiers to UN peacekeeping operations, which usually do not include troops from major powers to prevent local nationals from becoming concerned about great power agendas in their region. Since 1989, Jordan has provided more than 50,000 peacekeeping troops to 18 conflict areas and become the fourth largest provider of such troops after Pakistan, India, and Bangladesh.<sup>260</sup> Jordanian peacekeeping troops are exceptionally well-trained for their duties and make good use of the Zarqa-based Peacekeeping Operations Center.<sup>261</sup>

### **Jordan, Israel, and the Palestinian Territories.**

The Jordanian government remains an object of some regional and domestic suspicion because of its peace treaty with Israel. Moreover, at various times, the Jordanian leadership, and particularly King Hussein, seemed interested in a "warm peace" (including fully normalized economic and political relations) and were especially optimistic about the peace treaty in the immediate aftermath of its 1994 conclusion. Conversely, the treaty was never popular with significant portions

of the Jordanian public, and there has been a strong anti-normalization movement in Jordan as a result of efforts to move towards better relations with the Israelis. Much of the anti-normalization campaign has been led by the professional associations, provoking severe conflict between these groups and the government. The Jordanian relationship with Israel becomes more domestically unpopular at times of increased Arab-Israeli tension, such as during the summer 2006 Israeli-Hezbollah war in Lebanon.<sup>262</sup>

Jordanian leaders often justify their involvement with Israel with similar types of arguments they have traditionally used to justify involvement with the West. They suggest that Israel is too strong (and too close) to be ignored, and that failure to engage, manage, and moderate Israel will have catastrophic consequences for the Arab World. Jordanian leaders also suggest that they are using their relationship with Israel on behalf of the Palestinians and the larger Arab World.<sup>263</sup> The Arab League has recognized this role and formally requested Jordan and Egypt to undertake efforts to restart the peace process with Israel.<sup>264</sup> In late July 2007, Cairo and Amman moved forward with this effort by sending their foreign ministers on a diplomatic visit to Israel. This effort was a mostly symbolic move designed to highlight Arab willingness to seek peace with Israel within the context of the 2002 Arab League peace plan which envisions full Arab recognition of Israel in return for complete Israeli withdrawal from territories captured in the June 1967 Six Day War. While many Israelis accept the need for a two-state solution that forms the core of this plan, there are serious differences among them over how much land to return. Many Israelis also have doubts about the future of Palestinian governance especially since the January

2006 election of a Hamas-dominated legislature and the Hamas seizure of the Gaza Strip from its secular rival, Fatah, in June 2007. The Jordanians, by contrast, have been strong and consistent supporters of the 2002 Arab peace initiative despite the severe rise in intra-Palestinian problems.

Ongoing security concerns about Israeli-Palestinian problems are an especially serious burden at the present time when Jordan is also coping with refugee and terrorist spillover problems from Iraq. On the Palestinian front, dilemmas currently center on the political, economic, and humanitarian implications of the Hamas/Fatah power struggle and the emergence of separate Palestinian governments in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. A central Jordanian anxiety is that the Iraqi and Palestinian conflicts may become increasingly unmanageable simultaneously, creating difficulties for Jordan on both its eastern and western borders.<sup>265</sup> Also, despite the ongoing difficulties in Iraq, many Jordanians are convinced that the most serious problems they face may come from Israeli-Palestinian conflict and not from problems in Iraq. This outlook pre-dates Hamas seizure of Gaza, which can be seen as further vindication of making Palestinian problems a central priority.<sup>266</sup>

The Jordanians have continuously expressed fear that an intensification of Israeli/Palestinian differences or intra-Palestinian conflict on the West Bank will have strong negative implications for them. In the first 2 years of the al Aqsa Intifada beginning in September 2000, as many as 200,000 refugees fled the Palestinian territories to Jordan in order to escape the violence and economic strife caused by the confrontation.<sup>267</sup> This influx has continued at reduced levels since that time. The Jordanian government was especially alarmed by

the internecine warfare between Hamas and Fatah, and the armed Hamas takeover of the Gaza Strip in June 2007, but it does not clearly see that these events are the end of a downward spiral. Currently, the Jordanian government fears that the current struggle between Hamas and Fatah may spread into the West Bank and create more violence and a new flood of refugees. Many Palestinians currently living in the West Bank hold Jordanian passports and are legally entitled to migrate to Jordan if they choose to do so.<sup>268</sup> The fear of a widening conflict is also realistic.

Jordan remains interested in maintaining strong links to the West Bank despite the kingdom's formal renunciation of sovereignty in 1988, but the Jordanians have also strongly rejected the idea of a Jordanian-Palestinian union or confederation at the current time.<sup>269</sup> The idea of returning the West Bank to Jordanian sovereignty was supported by King Hussein to varying degrees until 1988, when the Jordanian government renounced all political ties to the West Bank. Recently, it has been revived by right wing Israeli leaders, including especially Likud leader Benjamin Netanyahu.<sup>270</sup> The Jordanians have stated that they want nothing to do with the confederation approach or any other sort of efforts at unity under present circumstances. King Abdullah called such proposals "a conspiracy" against Jordan.<sup>271</sup> Amman is also especially unwilling to deploy its troops into the West Bank despite some Israeli interest in such an eventuality.<sup>272</sup> To do this would undoubtedly create a domestic crisis in Jordan since the population would view this deployment as aiding the Israeli occupation. King Abdullah has called this line of thinking an unacceptable topic for discussion at this time.<sup>273</sup>

Jordanian-Palestinian relations within the kingdom are sufficiently complex that the government can be especially sensitive about forces that might aggravate them. Radicalization of Palestinians within Jordan's 13 refugee camps or more generally among the Jordanian public of Palestinian origin remains an important government concern. Jordan has also had to deal with a Palestinian leadership that it sometimes has viewed as severely flawed since before the beginning of King Abdullah's tenure. King Abdullah was occasionally blunt in criticizing the leadership of Palestinian Authority President Yassir Arafat's chaotic approach to governance and continuing tolerance for scandalous levels of corruption.<sup>274</sup> In contrast to Arafat, Amman views Fatah leader Mahmoud Abbas as relatively pro-Jordanian and generally comfortable with a Jordanian role in assisting and advising the Palestinians.<sup>275</sup> Jordan has even trained some Palestinian security forces loyal to Fatah, including the 1,500-person Badr Brigade.<sup>276</sup> This unit has been stationed in Jordan and must remain there for the time being by agreement with the Israelis.

If Jordan has found ways to work with Fatah, it nevertheless has many more difficulties in working with the Palestinian Islamic party, Hamas. In general, Jordanian relations with Hamas have suffered under King Abdullah, and many Hamas leaders have publicly lamented what they call King Abdullah's less sympathetic view of Hamas than the one held by his father. Hamas has no particular conflict with Jordan, but the Jordanian monarchy is nevertheless deeply concerned about the potential rise of Hamas' influence within the kingdom. The Jordanian leadership is also aware that the current U.S. leadership detests Hamas and that one of the major U.S. criticisms directed at

neighboring Syria is that it is much too generous in its treatment of Hamas. Hamas is grudgingly tolerated in Jordan under what has been described as a *de facto* understanding.<sup>277</sup> This understanding allows a Hamas presence in Jordan provided that the organization (1) does not claim responsibility for military actions, (2) does not issue military orders, and (3) does not interfere in Jordan's internal affairs.<sup>278</sup> The Jordanian government has also occasionally accused Hamas of meddling in Jordanian domestic affairs through coordination with the IAF and other Jordanian Islamists. Some IAF members are close to Hamas, while others keep their distance. The Jordanian security forces closely monitor this relationship.

Jordanian-Hamas tensions have remained high in recent years. The Jordanians are especially sensitive about the dangers of allowing a Palestinian armed presence in their country, and have accused Hamas of storing weapons in Jordan on a number of occasions. A particularly large arms cache was discovered by Jordanian security forces on April 18, 2006, leading to the cancellation of a visit to Jordan by Palestinian Foreign Minister Mahmoud Zahar.<sup>279</sup> According to Jordanian spokesmen, the arms cache included *katyusha* rockets and anti-tank missiles that were identified as Iranian.<sup>280</sup> These weapons may not have been received directly from Iran, but obtained indirectly through Iraqi sources. The Jordanians also maintain that these weapons were for use by Hamas members against Jordanian targets. In another low point in Jordanian relations with Hamas, three Hamas activists had their confessions of hiding these weapons broadcast on television in May 2006. The Hamas activists' confession included a statement that they had been trained in the use of weapons and explosives in Syria.<sup>281</sup> Jordanian

sources stated that these weapons explosives were to be used in a “Hamas plot” to “destabilize Jordan.”<sup>282</sup> Hamas emphatically denies this charge and claims that they had nothing to do with the weapons cache.<sup>283</sup> Rather, they suggested that the charges were part of an effort to undermine the Hamas leadership after its victory in the January 2006 Palestinian legislative elections.<sup>284</sup>

Problems with Israel also continue. The Jordanians have been especially angered by the speculation of Israeli political and military leaders that the Hashemite monarchy is living on borrowed time and can be expected to be overthrown at some point in the unspecified future.<sup>285</sup> Particularly infuriating was a statement attributed to Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert by the Israeli press that, “Israel is worried a hasty American withdrawal from Iraq could topple the Hashemite regime in Jordan.”<sup>286</sup> In response to this alleged statement the Jordanians suggested that Olmert would be better advised to worry about his own political future than the stability of Jordan. At the time, Olmert had the lowest public approval rating of any Prime Minister in Israeli history.<sup>287</sup>

## **Conclusions.**

Jordan has always been a pragmatic and pro-Western country, and this approach has frequently served Amman well at times of crisis. Nevertheless, King Abdullah often appears closer to the United States than King Hussein was in his last years in power. King Abdullah is also aligned closely with the United States at a time when it is deeply unpopular to do so in the Middle East. It is therefore at least possible that King Abdullah’s strong alliance with the West may hurt

him or even threaten Hashemite rule at some point. Helping Jordan survive, prosper, and modernize correspondingly has become an urgent priority for the United States in its quest for a stable and prosperous Middle East. The following policy recommendations are made with these concerns in mind.

**1. When the United States withdraws from Iraq, it will need to ensure that it maintains strong security relations with a variety of Arab countries including Jordan.** Iraqi factions no longer restrained by the United States may or may not choose to escalate fighting among themselves even if that country is calm when U.S. forces depart. In a worst case scenario, Jordan may well face additional difficulties with terrorism and refugees. A general U.S. disillusionment with Middle Eastern commitments may be natural after a long and painful war in Iraq, but such sentiments cannot be allowed to infect the U.S. approach to Jordan and other important regional allies. If it does, the negative results for the United States and its other regional allies may be impossible to reverse.

**2. If the United States chooses to press for increased democracy in Jordan, it must do so in the full understanding that a more democratic government will be less willing to cooperate with the United States and especially Israel.** As noted in this monograph, over half the population of Jordan is of Palestinian origin, and there is limited pragmatism regarding the Israelis among this group. Those democratic institutions that are allowed a certain degree of self-expression often call for the abrogation of the Israeli-Jordanian peace treaty and an end to U.S.-Jordanian cooperation on Iraq-related matters. While the United States favors democratic development in all states, a rational assessment of U.S. interests suggests

that a Jordanian go-slow approach to democracy may be the best thing for Jordan and the United States. Public U.S. criticism of Jordan for a lack of progress on democracy would, in most cases, be a serious mistake.

**3. In advising and supporting Jordan, the United States needs to balance the needs of national security with the requirement for political reform and a further opening of the Jordanian system. The United States should make no efforts which serve to undermine the Jordanian government in the name of reform.** Reform and democracy are vital in the Middle East, but there is no rational reason for undermining Jordanian authority and institutions at a point at which neighboring Iraq is in the middle of a sectarian crisis with the possibility of substantial spillover to its neighbors. The long-term path must always be considered, and a stalled reform process should never lead to a situation where reform efforts simply die out. A security system without a path to reform cannot be considered a long-term solution to Jordan's problems. Those Jordanians who are dissatisfied with the status quo need to know that there are other avenues to domestic change than violent extremism. The Jordanian government is aware of this situation and for its own survival will undertake reform at the most reasonable pace available.

**4. While showing a certain level of understanding about slow rates of political and judicial reform, the United States must never give the Jordanians the impression that it encourages or condones torture of captured terrorists.** Both the reputations of the United States and Jordan could be severely damaged by serious allegations on this regard. In light of problems that the United States has faced since 2004, it is stunning that any serious person could believe that the advantages of using torture would outweigh the drawbacks for the U.S. national interest.

**5. The U.S. leadership needs to strongly support the Middle East Peace Process as a way of not only moving toward Arab-Israeli peace but also supporting moderate Arab governments whose leadership maintains that there are nonviolent alternatives to resolving the Palestinian issue and other sources of Arab-Israeli division.** This statement is not meant to minimize the difficulties of moving forward with the peace process. Sometimes something as limited as continued discussions can be viewed as a victory if it staves off hopelessness and prevents any parties to the conflict from seeking violent alternatives.

**6. The U.S. leadership needs to remain aware that the Jordanian government is the blood enemy of al-Qaeda and will show no leniency in future confrontations.** While the Hashemites are known for seeking engagement with their enemies, they will never do so with al-Qaeda. Jordanian justice for its al-Qaeda enemies will, whenever possible, be swift and final.

**7. The United States needs to remain aware that the Muslim Brotherhood and the Islamic Action Front in Jordan are not terrorist organizations, although they have radical fringes.** Some extremists are part of these organizations, but in general these groups are nonviolent and loyal to the Hashemite crown even though they disagree with many Jordanian policies favored by the United States. The continued existence of these organizations may provide a vital channel for opposition to current government policies which in their absence could be expressed in violent and radical ways. The United States can also count upon the Jordanian government to prevent these groups from becoming too close to Hamas.

**8. The United States must continue to provide financial support for the King Abdallah II Special Operations Training Center and other Jordanian programs designed to train friendly Arab officers, police officials, and soldiers.** This center has thus far been funded only through a one-time grant of \$99 million and may require follow-on funds to operate at maximum capacity. Other nonfinancial links to the center, such as the provision of U.S. instructors including Special Forces troops, should be considered should they be requested. This facility is a vital institution for capacity-building and could become especially important in training elite and other forces from multiple Arab countries threatened by terrorism.

**9. The United States needs to continue its involvement in strong and continuing military-to-military cooperation with Jordanian forces.** This includes arms sales, joint and multilateral exercises, and other forms of military cooperation.

**10. The United States needs to continue and, if needed, expand intelligence cooperation with the Jordanians including coordination between U.S. and Jordanian military intelligence entities.** Jordanian officers and enlisted troops have long participated in military training and education in the United States, but this might be a particularly useful time to take a solid look at their enrollments in military intelligence courses at installations such as the Intelligence Center and School at Fort Huachuca, Arizona. Jordanian officers could learn a great deal by attendance at such courses, and American officers would learn a great deal from the Jordanians. Field grade and other Jordanian officers might also usefully teach courses in such environments if arrangements can be made with Amman for them to do so. The fact that the Jordanian

elite as well as large elements among the general public are almost completely bilingual in English and Arabic makes this possible.

**11. Should Iraq collapse into full-scale civil war after a departure of U.S. military forces, the United States will have to carefully consider how it might react to Jordanian support for some of the non-al-Qaeda Sunni combatants, and it may have to consider turning a blind eye to some Jordanian activities.** Jordanian support for such groups will respond to deep concerns that echo throughout all stratum of Jordanian society. Moreover, Jordanian involvement with these fighters will be designed to co-opt and manage them as well as to support them and help them displace and marginalize al-Qaeda fighters who hate Jordan as much as they hate the United States. It is better that Jordan have some involvement with Sunni fighters to displace the influence of radical groups such as al-Qaeda.

**12. The United States needs to find ways to help the Jordanians cope with the ongoing refugee crisis in that country.** To date, the United States has been so focused on dealing with Iraqi problems within Iraq that it has done very little to help Iraqis outside of their own country. This approach may be based on an optimist view of the Iraq situation whereby that country will recover to the point that it will soon start reabsorbing refugees. Nevertheless, the United States cannot be so optimistic in its planning that it seriously harms the Jordanians by ignoring the prospect for this problem to continue and even worsen.

## ENDNOTES

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14. Asher Susser, *On Both Banks of the Jordan: A Political Biography of Wasfi al-Tall*, Portland, Oregon: Frank Cass Publishers, 1994, p. 64.

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16. Queen Noor, *Leap of Faith, Memoirs of an Unexpected Life*, New York: Miramax Books, 2003, p. 118; Michael Bar-Zohar, *Shimon Peres: The Biography*, New York: Random House, 2007, chapter 28.

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18. Dan Kurzman, *Soldier of Peace: The Life of Yitzhak Rabin 1922-1995*, New York: HarperCollins, 1998, p. 514.

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22. Lisa Beyer, "A Man Who Might Have Been King," *Time*, November 23, 1999, internet.

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29. See, for example, Susser, "Abdullah's Scolding of Arafat. Note that Susser is one of Israel's top academic specialists on Jordanian politics.

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